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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the long-term evolution of legislation that contributed to 
the shift of China from a command economy to an economic powerhouse in the capitalist 
world economy. Few have discussed whether the concept of neoliberalization, defined as 
the process of adapting fiscal conservative and expert oriented policies, explains the 
longer-term trend of Chinese development. Therefore, this thesis sets out to make a 
determination whether China is evolving towards or away from the neoliberal model. To 
answer this question, this thesis analyzes two areas of legislation crucial in a free market: 
China’s trade and labor laws since the 1970s. More precisely, this research explores, 
through the lens of legislation, whether a trend of convergence between Western, 
exemplified by the United States, and Chinese political economies exists, and how the 
trend itself has changed over time and why. Using interview data based on 15 interviews 
from foreign entrepreneurs who work in Shanghai or Suzhou, this thesis uses the 
entrepreneurs’ perception of Chinese trade and labor to seek out reoccurring themes. 
Based on the information gathered from the literature on the Chinese development of 
wage and labor laws and the qualitative data in the interviews, this thesis found surprising 
similarities in Chinese and US policies, effects of those policies that were 
complementary, and a clear neoliberal direction in the 1980s-1990s in the United States 
and China. This thesis concludes, based on the policies implemented during the 2000s 
and 2010s, that this neoliberal direction shifts in both countries, and a different kind of 
model is taking shape in both China and the US that diverges from neoliberalism. 
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Chapter 1: Is China Neoliberal? 
 
 Within the large literature on Neoliberalism, it has been established that the 
implementation of pro-market reforms inspired by neoclassical economics has occurred 
in context specific ways. Under the rubric of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ or 
‘variegated neoliberalization’ scholars have discussed various place specific ways in 
which governments across the world have implemented free market reforms, leading to 
hybrid models between neoliberalism and pre-existing institutional arrangements. More 
recently, the very idea of neoliberalism is being challenged, arguing that oftentimes free 
market ideology is not necessarily the best way to interpret trends in policy making.  
 The evolution of China’s laws and institutions, together with its role in global 
trade and manufacturing is at the heart of those debates. Some scholars pointed to the 
apparent paradox of China’s reforms supporting the global diffusion of neoliberalism 
without having accepted neoliberal principles of policy making (Harvey, 2005), others 
pointed out the hybrid character of the Chinese government, having accepted both 
Neoliberal and Keynesian principles at national vs. provincial scales (Lan, Pickles, and 
Zhu, 2015). However, few have discussed whether the concept of neoliberalization 
explains the longer-term trend of Chinese development. Having established that China as 
a whole has adopted a mixed system, is it evolving towards, or away from the neoliberal 
model? Or rather should a different concept be used?  
 To answer these questions, this thesis analyzes two areas of legislation crucial in a 
free market: China’s trade and labor laws since the 1970s. The goal is to determine 
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whether the long-term evolution of legislation that contributed to the shift of China from 
a command economy, structured around principles partly inspired by the Soviet Union, to 
an economic powerhouse in the capitalist world economy, can or cannot be interpreted in 
the theoretical framework of neoliberalization. More precisely, this research will explore, 
through the lens of legislation, whether a trend of convergence between ‘Western’ and 
Chinese political economies exists, and how the trend itself has changed over time and 
why. 
Because the notion of ‘West’ is in itself vague, and because various Western 
countries exhibited various patterns of adoption of the neoliberal model, or even utter 
rejection, I will use one specific country as term of comparison: the United States. First 
of all, together with the UK, the United States was the first country to start the process of 
abandoning Keynesianism in favor or a neoliberal, laissez faire, political economy under 
the Reagan presidency. Second the US had been throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
the strongest supporter of neoliberalism, to the point that policy circles dubbed the free-
market policies adopted by a large number of countries in the 1990s as ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Lopes, 2012). Third, exactly like China has adopted a mixed neoliberal and 
Keynesian model, scholars have argued that the US has structured its own domestic 
policies as a compromise between Keynesianism and neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005), even 
during the years in which US foreign policy was actively promoting neoliberal reforms 
across the globe. Fourth, the US itself is showing a specific trajectory, with an increasing 
adoption of neoliberal reforms under Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton, a more mixed 
system under Bush Jr. and Obama, and the possibility of a reversal under Trump’s 
presidency. Thus, a comparison with the US allows us to understand neoliberalization not 
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as a linear process towards the principles of free market, but as highly contested process 
subject to reversals. Fifth and perhaps most important, the bulk of investments that jump 
started Chinese development in the 1990s came from a handful of US multinationals, via 
the mediation of Chinese expatriates (Harvey, 2005). Thus, the theoretical question of the 
long term neoliberalization process of China in relation to the US becomes an empirical 
question on the extent to which highly interconnected trade and investments drives 
institutional convergence.  
Thus, this research involves going through key trade and labor laws enacted in 
China at the national and provincial levels since the 1970s, along with other indicators I 
chose to analyze in each decade, and comparing them with similar trends in the United 
States. In so doing, I seek to answer the following research questions:  
A. Does a trend of convergence between ‘Western’ and Chinese political 
economies exist?  
B. If there is a trend, how has it changed over time?   
C. Is China evolving towards, or away from the neoliberal model? Or 
rather should a different concept be used? 
Answers to those questions contribute to the discussion of China’s reform by adding a 
long-term perspective to Lan et al. and Zhu’s (2015) argument about the specific hybrid 
characteristics of China’s neoliberalization.   
My thesis will consist of five primary chapters, the first of which is the 
introduction. This introductory chapter will include a discussion on the notion and 
evolution of neoliberalism followed by the methodology of my research.  
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The second chapter will be the evolution of labor and trade laws in China and the 
US. In developing this chapter, I will break the US and the Chinese literature down into 
decades, starting in 1979, when Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with 
pragmatic market economy whose slogan was “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics."  I will analyze in parallel the key indicators of each decade in the United 
States and China, listed in the methodology, along with the trade and labor laws enacted 
in China at the national and provincial levels since the 1970s and the trade and labor laws 
enacted in the United States since the 1970s. 
In the third chapter, I will compare China and the United States by using the 
previously analyzed reforms and indictors in the second chapter to analyze trends in US 
and Chinese policy.  Based on the evolution of reforms and trends in policy in both 
countries, I will make a determination whether the United States and China are becoming 
more or less close to the neoliberal principle over time.  
The fourth chapter of my thesis will include my impression of entrepreneurs in 
China.  I will discuss the perception of Chinese trade and labor by foreign entrepreneurs, 
using interview data from a project titled “Opening the black box of the State” collected 
in 2013-2015. In this chapter, I will summarize my analysis of the interview data in order 
to determine if the subset of international entrepreneurs are experiencing a convergence 
or a divergence from the neoliberal model in China.  
 In my fifth and final chapter, I will use the information gathered from the 
literature of the previous chapters and the qualitative data in the interviews to draw a 
conclusion about whether China’s laws are becoming more or less close to the neoliberal 
principle over time. 
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China and Neoliberalism 
 
 Neoliberalism is an ideology that has, since the 1980s to present, “permeated an 
enormous amount of policy debates, on the global scale” (Vincent, 2010, p. 347). This 
ideology identifies "the unregulated free-market capitalist order as the crucial ground for 
all efficient resource allocation” (Vincent, 2010, p. 347). The founding figures of 
neoliberal thought took "political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as 
fundamental, as the central values of civilization” (Harvey, 2005, p. 5). In theory, 
neoliberalism is an ideology or belief system in which “individual liberty and freedom 
are the high points of civilization, which are best protected by strong property rights, free 
market, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2).  Although neoliberalism can be difficult to 
define in this day and age, at its core, it is a revival of the eighteenth century doctrines of 
individual liberty and freedom. 
The overshadowing importance accorded by some "to the phenomenon of 
neoliberalism does not signify, however, that it is a clearly defined concept” (Thorsen 
and Lie, 2006, p. 2). This is due, in part, because ‘actual existing neoliberalism’ “can 
differ profoundly from the theoretical constructs propagated by neoliberalism’s 
supporters, including the major international financial institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank” (Hirt, Sellar, and Young, 2013, p. 
1243).  What makes a practice neoliberal is often very unclear, and the term neoliberal 
has come to change meaning overtime.  From the 1930s to the 1960s, “neoliberalism had 
an earlier life when it was used in a positive sense by a group of intellectuals, including 
the economists Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek and Wilhelm Ropke” (Eagleton-
Pierce, 2016, p. 175), but starting in the 1980, the term ‘neoliberalism’ came to mean 
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something else. During this time, it came to “denote a set of policy tendencies that were 
first crafted and tested in Western countries, notably the UK and the US (but also 
elsewhere), before spreading to other regions” (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, p. XIV).  
According to academic critics, like the geographer David Harvey (2005), neoliberalism 
should be understood as “a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital 
accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19), or in 
other words, he believes neoliberalism should be read “as an agenda led by, and for, 
powerful elites, one which emerged in reaction to the perceived failures of Keynesianism 
and the strength of postwar social movements” (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, p. XIV).  Other 
critics of neoliberalism argue that neoliberalism, while ill defined, is commonly 
associated with the expansion of commercial markets and the privileging of corporations; 
“the re-engineering of government as an entrepreneurial actor; and the imposition of 
fiscal discipline, particularly in welfare spending” (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, p. XV).  
For the twenty-five years after World War II (1945-1970), "Keynesianism 
constituted the dominant paradigm for understanding the determination of economic 
activity” (Palley, 2004, p. 2). However, in the mid-1970s "the Keynesian impulse went 
into reverse, to be replaced by neoliberalism” (Palley, 2004, p. 2). The motivation lying 
behind this attack on Keynesianism was primarily “a concern with taxation and inflation, 
brought to widespread attention during the stagflation crisis of the 1970s when both 
unemployment and inflation rose dramatically” (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4). 
Soaring inflation battered the U.S. economy in the 1970s, ending only after the Fed, 
under Chairman Paul Volcker, abandoned Keynesian policies and "applied contractionary 
(tight) monetary policy to rein in inflation"(Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4). The 
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Volcker shock, as it has since come to be known, "has to be interpreted as a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for neoliberalization” (Harvey, 2005, p. 24). Ronald Reagan’s 
victory over Carter in 1980 is another crucial moment in the movement toward 
neoliberalism. Because of forty years of Keynesian economics based on a strong active 
role of the government in crisis, this period of extreme unemployment and inflation made 
way for Reagan to come in and do things differently. Because "Reagan’s advisers were 
convinced that Volcker’s monetarist medicine’ for a sick and stagnant economy was right 
on target, Volcker was supported in and reappointed to his position as chair of the Federal 
Reserve” (Harvey, 2005, p. 25). Coupled with Volker’s reappointment, the Reagan 
administration “provided the requisite political backing through further deregulation, tax 
cuts, budget cuts, and attacks on trade union and professional power” (Harvey, 2005, p. 
25).  
Reagan’s campaign against big government began to change the shape of the 
country in the 1980s. His administration’s deregulation of “everything from airlines to 
telecommunications to finance opened up new zones of untrammeled market freedoms 
for powerful corporate interests” (Harvey, 2005, p. 26). This deregulation had many 
effects domestically and abroad. Finance capital increasingly looked abroad for higher 
rates of return and deindustrialization at home and shifts to take production abroad 
became much more common (Harvey, 2005). Harvey argues that this began the great 
“shift towards greater social inequality and the restoration of economic power to the 
upper classes” (2005, p. 26). As evidence, he states, “The market, depicted ideologically 
as the way to foster completion and innovation, became a vehicle for the consolidation of 
monopoly power. Corporate taxes were reduced dramatically, and the top personal tax 
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rate was reduced from 70 to 28 percent in what was billed as ’the largest tax cut in 
history’” (Harvey, 2005, p. 26).   
However, deregulation alone was not sufficient to bring about the deep changes 
that begun in the 1980s. Coupled with them, the second large scale transformation was 
the so called ‘financialization’ – i.e. the shift of investments, profits and employment 
from a mostly domestic manufacturing sector to the financial sector – which became 
rapidly transnational. One major consequence of deregulation was the opening up of 
financial markets, which had a domino effect of increasing the importance of finance in 
the overall economy of developed countries. Harvey argues that "deregulation allowed 
the financial system to become one of the main centers of redistributive activity through 
speculation, predation, fraud, and thievery” (Harvey, 2005, p. 161).  The following 
became central features of the capitalist financial system: stock promotions, ponzi 
schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset-stripping through mergers 
and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt incumbency that reduced whole 
populations, and dispossession of assets (Harvey, 2005).   
 Scholars point out that neoliberalism goes hand in hand with financialization. 
 Because of neoliberalism, a major transition took place that shifted labor from 
manufacturing to service jobs. This shift did not take place naturally but occurred because 
“a wave of innovations occurred in the financial services to produce not only far from 
sophisticated global interconnections but also new kinds of financial markets based on 
scrutinization, derivatives, and all manner of futures trading” (Harvey, 2005, p. 33). 
Because gains in manufacturing capacity no longer meant rising per capita incomes and 
the concentration of financial services did, there was an undeniable power shift away 
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from manufacturing to the world of finance (Harvey, 2005). For this reason, “the support 
of financial institutions and the integrity of the financial system became the central 
concern of the collectivity of neoliberal states” (Harvey, 2005, p. 33). This rising class 
power gave an enormous amount of power to bankers, CEOs, and leaders in financial 
apparatuses since speculative gains “made it possible to amass enormous fortunes within 
a very short period of time” (Harvey, 2005, p. 34).  
The large scales of transformation of the global economy – neoliberalization and 
financialization – that occurred in the 1980s cannot be explained without an 
understanding of how, first, US elites bought into the principles formulated by Hayek and 
the Chicago economists, and, second, how they were able to convince the public to buy 
in, against the apparent interests of a largely middle class, manufacturing based society. 
Harvey describes the spread of neoliberalism in the United States by using the term 
‘common sense’, and in using this term, he means that consent was “constructed out of 
long- standing practices of cultural socialization often rooted deep in regional or national 
traditions” (Harvey 2005, p. 39). This is key for political action since the United States is 
a democracy; and therefore, neoliberalism had to be accomplished by democratic means. 
As Harvey states, “For a shift of this magnitude to occur required the prior construction 
of political consent across a sufficiently large spectrum of the population to win 
elections” (Harvey, 2005, p. 39). This popular consent of neoliberalism was generated in 
a variety of ways, but more specifically “powerful ideological influences circulated 
through the corporations, the media, and the numerous institutions that constitute civil 
society––such as the universities, schools, churches, and professional associations” 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 40). The elites had enough power and money to organize institutions 
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such as think tanks that promoted neoliberal ideals of freedom and liberty. The high 
frequency of neoliberal ideas through these institutions, “the capture of certain segments 
of the media, and the conversion of many intellectuals to neoliberal ways of thinking, 
created a climate of opinion in support of neoliberalism as the exclusive guarantor of 
freedom” (Harvey, 2005, p. 40). Harvey then describes how this was a domino effect 
when “these movements were later consolidated through the capture of political parties 
and, ultimately, state power” (2005, p. 39). 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, "American power grew 
yet further"  (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4). The "shock therapy and the big bang 
which accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet system in the late 1980s and early 
1990s are commonly identified as neoliberal” (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 4), and it 
has been argued that neoliberalism was imposed on post-Soviet countries by hegemonic 
international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Gowan, 1995). It 
is important to note that "Russia's reformers were not blindly following an ideological 
agenda set for them in Washington, DC." (Rutland, 2012, p. 332).  With 
Russia struggling economically, the Russian leaders were looking for new models of 
behavior, and the  “prevailing ideas of the Washington Consensus undoubtedly 
encouraged Russia's leaders to embrace radical reforms” (Rutland, 2012, p. 332). The 
collapse of the Soviet Union along with financial institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank created an environment in the 1990s where world markets become more integrated 
and more countries adopt neoliberal policies. While Western countries like the US and 
the UK were implementing their policies under the notion of neoliberalism in the 1980s, 
it is important to point out that they were not the success stories, but instead, Germany 
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and Japan were. Germany and Japan used "state intervention to prevent monopolies and 
encourage competition among small and medium-sized businesses” and did 
not implement across-the-board free market principles, but both countries managed to 
develop reasonably well  (Hickel, 2012). In spite of the US and the UK aiming to incur 
growth in their economies with neoliberalism, "neither Britain nor the US achieved high 
levels of economic performance in the 1980s, suggesting that neoliberalism was not the 
answer to capitalists’ prayers” (Harvey, 2005, p. 88). While inflation was lowered and 
interest rates fell, this happened at the expense of high rates of unemployment, which 
diminished the quality of life for many people and resulted in a mix of low growth and 
increasing income inequality (Harvey, 2005). Unlike the US and the UK, the 1980s 
belonged to Japan and West Germany as competitive powerhouses of the global economy 
(Harvey, 2005). Harvey makes the point that “their success in the absence of any 
wholesale neoliberal reforms makes it difficult to argue that neoliberalization progressed 
on the world stage as a proven palliative of economic stagnation” (Harvey, 2005, p. 88).  
Neoliberal reforms were further pushed across the world because, thanks to a 
combination of pressure from the US government and the hiring of economists trained in 
top US universities, the two largest international financial institutions, the IMF and the 
World Bank, adopted guiding principles borrowed from neoliberalism. Since the 1990s, 
“the US government, along with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
have exerted pressure on developing and developed countries alike to adopt similar 
reforms” (Hirt, Sellar, and Young, 2013, p. 1244). However, such apparent success of the 
neoliberal project did not turn non-Western economies into carbon copies of the US, as 
predicted in the early 1990s by Francis Fukuyama, who, under the label ‘the end of 
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history’ had assumed a converged of the global political economy towards the liberal-
democratic system (Fukuyama, 1992). Instead, hybrids between neoliberal principles and 
local institutional arrangements started to develop. 
Scholars studying neoliberalism outside Western settings noticed that this 
political-economic ideology did not “trickle down to the local context and then, once it 
hits the ground running, work following a clearly pre-determined pathway” (Hirt, Sellar, 
and Young, 2013, p. 1245). As Cochrane and Ward state, “It is no longer possible to view 
the world through lenses that implicitly or explicitly locate the politics of public policy 
within national bounded systems” (2012, p. 5). It is already widely recognized that “it is 
rarely possible to transfer policies directly, precisely because they emerge from and are 
responses to particular ‘local’ sets of social and political conditions which are not 
replicated in the places to which they are transplanted” (Cochrane and Ward, 2012, p. 5). 
The evidence suggests “that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or 
sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be 
unrecognizable” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19). Critics of the neoliberal theory, such as Harvey, 
highlight a “creative tension between the power of neoliberal ideas and the actual 
practices of neoliberalization that have transformed how global capitalism has been 
working over the last three decades” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19).  
In discussing neoliberalism, many scholars highlight the idea of crises since it 
shows the vulnerability of the system and can be a way to criticize the usefulness of 
neoliberalism. Ken Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko argue that "the credit crunch and banking 
crisis have exposed the fault lines in the neoliberal economic order that has been 
dominant for the last three decades” (2010, p. 4). Many scholars argue that that financial 
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crises were used as a tool to spread neoliberalism, and Harvey describes this is much 
detail, but his main point is that “financial crises were endemic and contagious” (Harvey, 
2005, p. 94). The basic argument is that because neoliberalism is all about opening up 
free trade and free markets, countries become very interconnected financially. 
Neoliberalism has cycles of boom and bust, and in neoliberal theory, these cycles are free 
to express themselves, including the more painful moments of crisis. Either a major or 
minor player in that situation might drag along everyone else since neoliberalism made 
economies much more interconnected than ever before. The literature surrounding 
neoliberalism suggests that the International Monetary Fund was a major player in 
spreading neoliberalism, and scholars back up this claim in using many examples of 
countries going through crises and the IMF bailing them out. While in many countries it 
seemed like neoliberalism was dying due to the various crises, "the institutions associated 
with its rise were not all equally moribund. For example, the global economic crisis has 
unexpectedly improved the fortunes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an 
organization long famous for the neoliberal policy conditions attached to its loans” 
(Chorev and Babb, 2009, p. 460). To give a specific example, East Asia had developed 
very fast in 1980s and 1990s, but by 1997, they hit a financial crisis. It began with bubble 
in housing market, and in reaction, East Asia had to devalue their currency to make 
payments on loans. A devastating amount of private capital left the country, and since 
banks were unable to invest money, they went under. That situation spread very fast in 
Thailand, and like a domino effect, hit everyone. At this point, scholars point out that the 
IMF came in and agreed to bail them out under the condition that they adopt more 
neoliberal policies such as less state spending, which can make the crises even deeper. It 
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has been long argued in the literature that the neoliberal age increased trade, made 
countries much more interconnected, and as a result, economic crises became much more 
contagious. 
Other scholars point to the different impacts and implications of the recent 
economic crises in order to illustrate the “diversity in the implementation and 
embeddedness of neoliberalism in many countries, thereby suggesting that neoliberalism 
is not (and never was) a single hegemonic system in the first place” (Birch and 
Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 5). Before the financial-economic crisis in 2008, "the political 
ascendance and geographical spread of neoliberalism had been greatly aided by the 
maintenance of dogmatic and rhetorical purity” (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 5), and 
while persistently advocating “maximum scope for the free play of market forces in 
economy and society, neoliberal ideologues were able to specify their own 
recommendations aimed at achieving a free market evolution” (Birch and Mykhnenko, 
2010, p. 5). The crisis of neoliberalism was embodied in the U.S financial crisis of 2008, 
which catalyzed cascading chains of financial crises across the globe (Dutta, 
2015).  While the great depression, the financial crisis in Mexico, the financial crisis in 
Japan, and the financial crisis in Thailand all had different characteristics, all these 
various crises in different countries play into the financial crisis of 2008 because “it’s like 
everything we’ve seen before, all at once: a bursting real estate bubble comparable to 
what happened in Japan at the end of the 1980s; a wave of bank runs comparable to those 
of the early 1930s; a liquidity trap in the United States, and most recently, a disruption of 
international capital flows and a wave of currency crises all too reminiscent of what 
happened to Asia in the late 1990s” (Krugman, 2009, p. 152).  
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After the crisis of 2008, scholars started to notice that something was beginning 
to change in the global economy and policy making that was leading to a world that is 
different than the world Reagan and Thatcher initiated in the 1980s. Yates-Bakker (2013) 
and Gereffi (2014) notice that the world after 2008 is not as neoliberal. Yates-Bakker 
notices this change in Latin America while Gereffi notices that policies at the global level 
are changing.  Latin America is particularly interesting because it is becoming the place 
where the big innovation of the global economy happened first. In the 1970s, Latin 
America was the first example of neoliberal policies, and following a similar pattern in 
the early 2000s, Latin American governments were already implementing policies that 
were consciously trying to do something different from the principle of free trade that 
was strongly advocated by the US and the rest of the world. Yates-Bakker shows that 
Latin America is ahead of the curve once again, and he does this though the notion of 
post neoliberalism which he describes as "a combination of an ideological project and a 
set of policies and practices that revolves around the dual aim of: (1) redirecting a market 
economy towards social concerns; and (2) reviving citizenship via a new politics of 
participation and alliances across sociocultural sectors and groups” (64). In sum, he 
argues that post neoliberalism is a nondramatic shift away from neoliberal principle (free 
market and privatization) and is more of an evolution and not so much a 
revolution. Neoliberalism in Latin America in the 1990s-2000s stimulated growth, but 
this variegated neoliberalism (where the IMF, the World Bank, and some political parties 
take some parts of the neoliberal project and apply it in their own ways) also had many 
negative impacts on different Latin American countries such as crowding out domestic 
producers, sacrificing entire economic sectors. This paired with the small domestic 
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profits led to social unrest, and as a result of this unrest, many socialist governments were 
elected in various elections in the 2000s. With these new governments, Yates-Bakker 
noticed that there were changes in political discourse. Politicians talked less about free 
trade and started to talk more about justice, and policy changes were adopted that enabled 
states to reassert control over markets.  Because people in Latin America were unhappy 
with the results of neoliberal policies, the rules of the game of the global economy begin 
to change. Yates-Bakker says that it is not dramatic or revolutionary, but we start to see 
something different, which leads me into Gereffi’s argument on how the global economy 
is changing. Because “the increasing importance of GVCs in the current era challenges 
the traditional way of measuring countries’ export performance and international 
competitiveness” (Gereffi, 2014, p. 11), he argues that some governments are becoming 
more proactive in managing the economy, and rather than having all neoliberal trade 
principles, they are trying to target their own supply chains in their policies. He also 
argues that there is an emergence of new powerful actors in the value chains and that 
power is shifting in the value chains. In the past, the retailer was the most powerful in the 
chain, but in recent years in various industries, some other companies, that are not the big 
retailer, are emerging as the most powerful. Gereffi believes we are moving from the 
traditional Washington consensus model to a post Washington consensus model. The 
principles of the Washington consensus such as free trade and no government 
intervention are being put into question. In the traditional Washington consensus, leader 
firms were Western large manufacturers like Wal Mart, Apple, and GM, but in the post 
Washington consensus, Gereffi is seeing new leaders emerge among intermediaries like 
Foxconn. The result is fewer and larger suppliers and more profit and innovation outside 
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the West. 
Since the 1970s, China had developed a hybrid system, and because of the 2008 
global financial crisis, scholars point out that other hybrid systems like China also began 
forming. Because China had not freed up their capital markets and suffered far less in the 
financial crisis of those that had (Harvey, 2010), a new model of doing international 
business that is not pure laissez faire like they do in the West emerges. The literature 
suggests that China’s policy response to the global financial and economic crisis was 
early, large, and well designed (Lardy, 2012). Although "Chinese financial institutions 
had little exposure to the toxic financial assets that brought down many large Western 
investment banks and other financial firms, China’s leadership recognized that the 
country’s high dependence on exports meant that it was acutely vulnerable to a global 
economic recession” (Lardy, 2012, p. 5). The Chinese government did not subscribe to 
the view that simply by increasing intraregional trade, could by and large weather the 
global financial storm that originated in the United States and other advanced industrial 
economies (Lardy, 2012).  After the economies of "Western nations imploded in late 
2008 talk spread, not just in China but also across the West, of the advantages of the so-
called China model-a vaguely defined combination of authoritarian politics and state-
guided capitalism- that was to be the guiding light for this century" (Wong, 2012). 
 While many scholars have used neoliberalism to explain what happened to the 
economy in various places around the world, there is recent scholarship that has 
questioned the relevance of the concept of neoliberalism as a whole and does not believe 
it to be a reality anymore. In 2014, Sally Weller and Phillip O’Neill set out to determine 
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whether Australia’s development path is or has been neo-liberalist, and these scholars 
came to the conclusion that “Australia’s developmental trajectory has never been 
neoliberal in intent or outcome, even in a distinct or hybrid form” (p. 106). While 
Australia is one case, it is important to highlight Australia’s position in the global 
framework. Australia is a part of the advanced economy of the global north and 
“therefore is integrated into a transatlantic neoliberal project” (Weller and O’Neill, 2014, 
p. 106). While their case study specifically pertains to Australia, the scholars more 
generally conclude that “despite numerous liberalizations, neoliberal scripts have been 
contested and discarded more often than they have been modified and reproduced” 
(Weller and O’Neill, 2014, p. 106). Other scholars also share Weller and O’Neill’s 
concern about the “extent to which neoliberalism has become a summary word that elides 
a complex reality and dissuades close political engagement” (2014, p. 125). Noel Castree 
believes scholars begin their research assuming that neoliberalism exists, but in doing so, 
they “are examining contingently occurring processes and outcomes that may well have 
operated differently if the neoliberal component had not been present” (2006, p. 4).  
Castree suspects neoliberalism will remain a necessary illusion or “something we know 
doesn’t exist as such, but the idea of whose existence allows our local research finding to 
connect to a much bigger and apparently important conversation” (Castree, 2006, p. 4). 
Other scholars also believe we should abandon neoliberalism in contextualizing the 
economy at the local and global scales. Clive Barnett argues that neoliberalism 
conveniently helps tell the story of how the world operates in explaining how “liberalism 
privileges the market and individual self-interest” (2011, p. 270), but through his 
research, he concludes that theories of neoliberalism “provide little assistance in thinking 
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about how best to balance equally compelling imperatives to respect pluralistic difference 
and enable effective collective action” (Barnett, 2011, p. 270). Overall, these various 
scholars are contending the relevance of the very concept of neoliberalism and are 
concerned that this story has been played out too far. As Weller and O’Neill point out, “If 
we know the story too well, our openness to the unexpected is compromised” (Weller and 
O’Neill, 2014, p. 125), and when we allow the notion of neoliberalism to include every 
aspect that contributes to a regime, “then every observed innovation, including those with 
non-neo-liberal motivations, can be rolled into an overarching story” (Weller and 
O’Neill, 2014, p. 125).  
 Within the story of Neoliberalism, it is hard to specifically place China. China sits 
in an awkward position since the various literatures have different ideas on how China 
fits into the context of neoliberalism. Harvey argues that China is not neoliberal but 
enables neoliberalism. While he concludes that China is a “market economy that 
increasingly incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized 
control” (Harvey, 2005, p. 120), Nonie argues that contemporary China is not " neoliberal 
in either a strong or weak sense, nor undergoing a process of neoliberalization” (2008). 
Some literature claims that China is neoliberal at the national level but Keynesian at the 
provincial level (Lan, Pickles, and Zhu, 2015) while others believe the “extent to which 
(and in what ways) China's reforms can be considered neoliberal is conditioned by the 
continuing importance and involvement of the state in all spheres of activity” (Wu, 2013, 
p. 620).  
 Globalization is an indispensable component of neoliberalism. The one thing the 
literature generally agrees on is that Chinese development was crucial for enabling 
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Western neoliberalism. It is important to not that "as capitalist accumulation proceeds, 
both labor and the environment tend to become increasingly more expensive” (Li, 2005, 
p. 420), and "capitalism has been able to keep expanding through access to areas where 
labor and resources remain cheap and abundant, and where spaces for pollution remain 
available” (Li, 2005, p. 420) Towards the late 20th Century, "much of China’s labor force 
remained in the rural areas and was readily available for capitalist accumulation on 
favorable terms.  The political conditions in China were such that massive resource 
depletion and environmental pollution would meet with minimal resistance in the short 
and medium-run” (Li, 2005, p. 420).  Because of China’s vast amount of labor and 
organized government, Western countries started outsourcing cheap labor to China. 
China provided the fuel that the Western neoliberal nations of the 1990s and 2000s 
needed. China went from the poorest to the largest world economy in part because the 
Western neoliberal countries implemented neoliberal policies and went out looking for 
cheap labor. Overall, the Western neoliberal market economy and Chinese development 
could develop together since they were in a trade relationship with each other.  
 Because Chinese development was pivotal for enabling Western neoliberalism, 
the relationship between China and the neoliberal model should be studied more in depth. 
While scholars generally disagree on how neoliberalism applies to China, the scholars 
studying China have rarely adopted a long-term view. With the long-term view in mind, I 
will look at the parallel development of Chinese policies and Western neoliberalism.  In 
setting out on a different path from other scholars who have previously researched this 
subject, my contribution to the literature will be to analyze how the evolution of Western 
neoliberalism matches the evolution of Chinese reforms and systems overtime.  
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Methodology 
The history of neoliberalism makes clear that the implementation of neoliberalism 
itself is not static. Scholars point out the various ways it has evolved from the 1980s. The 
literature is also in consensus that China was an important part of its evolution, but 
scholars disagree over whether China is neoliberal or not.  The key argument of this 
thesis is that the very asking of the question of the extent of Chinese neoliberalization 
may be masking the nuances of China’s contribution to the global political economy. 
First of all, the neoliberal project itself is not static: the policies and ideology that 
scholars include under the ever-broadening term ‘neoliberalism’ are in constant flux. 
Scholarship about actually existing neoliberalism has shown that the neoliberal project 
varies over space; fewer scholars have detailed how neoliberalism has evolved over time. 
However, especially the discussion of post-2008 neoliberalism suggests that the temporal 
dimension should be taken more seriously. Second, China itself is experiencing a rapid 
social, cultural, and economic transformation. Thus, in order to better consider the long 
term view, I want to compare on a decade-by decade basis, the main trends in the 
evolution of the neoliberal project in the US and global institutions with some of the 
major indicators of Chinese neoliberalization. 
This thesis chooses to focus on Chinese trade and labor laws as indicators for the 
extent to which China approaches neoliberalism over time or not. Neoliberalism 
“emphasizes the primacy of markets over government, and which advocates policies that 
have led to the deregulation of labor markets, and the dismantling of the social 
protections and redistributive policies of the earlier welfare state” (Moutsatsos, 2008). 
Because I am analyzing how the evolution of Western neoliberalism matches the 
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evolution of Chinese reforms and systems overtime, it stands to reason that labor and 
trade laws are key indicators of neoliberalization: according to the literature, the latter 
need to be understood as a process of progressive erosion of legal protections to labor; it 
also need to be understood as an opening of markets, that do not involve only the 
reduction of customs duties, but also give an ‘upper hand’ to private companies when 
negotiating with government overseas. Thus, by looking at these two areas of law in their 
evolution over time it will be possible to examine whether China is becoming more or 
less neoliberal, and whether it is converging with the West.  
More specifically, when adopting neoliberal policies, governing states are 
prompted to minimize the public sector, privatize all social services, make labor markets 
“flexible, i.e., accommodate the fluctuating needs of various industries but without the 
safety net of long-term secure employment (Moutsatsos, 2008). These changes in global 
labor trends correspond to the shift toward “flexible business practices employed by 
corporations and manufacturers and the decline of unionized workforces in industrialized 
countries since the 1970s” (Moutsatsos, 2008). Such practices include off-shoring, 
outsourcing, and subcontracting. China’s development has clearly benefited from 
Western outsourcing, but it is questionable whether or not it has eroded Chinese workers’ 
safety nets. 
Labor and wage laws are key indicators in my research design since the literature 
has made it clear that neoliberalism takes shape through laws. Whether through a “rolling 
back of regulation or a rolling out of market-style governance, neoliberalism is always 
mediated through law” (Grewal and Purdy, 2015, p. 9). The disputes that these laws 
address are embedded in such questions as “the scope and nature of property rights 
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(including intellectual property), the constitutional extent of the government’s power to 
regulate, the appropriate aims and techniques of administrative agencies, and the nature 
of the personal liberty and equality that basic constitutional protections enshrine” 
(Grewal and Purdy, 2015, p. 9). Because laws can help to directly pinpoint if legislation 
is becoming more or less neoliberal (more or less property rights, trade regulation, etc), 
trade and labor laws become objective and comparable indicators when analyzing in 
parallel the evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism in the West with the 
evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism China. 
 While some scholars have chosen to use financial systems as indicators in 
discussing and analyzing neoliberalism, I chose not to since  “China’s financial system is 
particularly hard to analyze because it is highly opaque and evolving rapidly” (Elliott and 
Yan, 2013, p. 2). Because “every decade sees major changes in the regulation, structure, 
and operation of finance in China, consistent with the rapid changes in the nation’s 
overall economic and political development,” (Elliott and Yan, 2013, p. 2), China’s 
financial system would be hard to directly compare to the West in a quantifiable and 
objective way, especially since the Chinese government “intervenes far more actively in 
banking decisions than in the West” (Elliott and Yan, 2013, p. 2). Also, this information 
would be extremely difficult to obtain since “only a few decades ago the private financial 
sector virtually did not exist and all banking was done through branches of the state-
owned People’s Bank of China” (Elliott and Yan, 2013, p. 2).  
In analyzing the trade and labor laws in China, I chose to look at both the national 
level and the local level when possible. Scholars such as Fan Lim believe that the size of 
China allows for governments at the local level to experiment with different policies. 
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Because “central planning is reconfigured through the dialectical differentiation of 
Chinese state spatiality and the variegated adaptation of neoliberal logics across different 
scales” (Fan Lim, 2014, p. 242), the national and provincial governments may follow 
different patterns (Tu Lan, 2016), so both will need to be investigated. 
In analyzing in parallel the evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism 
in the West with the evolution of the main characteristics of neoliberalism in China, I 
chose to use the United States to represent the West. Since the West is so diverse, it 
makes more sense to focus on the United States in order to avoid a general comparison 
and to be able to specifically compare the indicators of neoliberalism in China with the 
indicators of neoliberalism in one representative country of the West. The United States 
is the best country to compare with China in the context of neoliberalization since the 
United States was the engine of neoliberalism.  While neoliberalism was a set of policy 
tendencies that were first crafted and tested by both the UK and the US (Eagleton-Pierce, 
2016), neoliberal reforms were further pushed across the world thanks to a combination 
of pressure from the US government, the hiring of economists trained in top US 
universities, and the two largest international financial institutions, the IMF and the 
World Bank. Not only is the United States the earliest country adopting the neoliberal 
mode, but they are credited with spreading neoliberalism since “the US government, 
along with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have exerted pressure 
on developing and developed countries alike to adopt similar reforms” (Hirt, Sellar, and 
Young, 2013, p. 1244). The United States is also the best indicator when analyzing 
neoliberalism in the West compared to China since the United States is the country whose 
foreign investments, caused by neoliberal policies in the first place, enabled Chinese 
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development.  
While scholars debate the extent to which China is neoliberal, the literature also 
makes clear that the United States is not fully neoliberal. This is especially clear in the 
recent election of President Donald Trump. Scholars point out that Trump “channels the 
hostility generated by that neoliberal indifference to the well-being of working people 
and its scarcely concealed cultural contempt for heartland America into a racially 
inflected anti-establishmentarianism” (Fraser, 2016). In many ways, Trump’s victory, is 
both a break from the status quo and something new in that it expects a person with no 
government experience to fix the government. This belief says that only a 
nongovernmental person can save government (Schultz, 2017). While “his victory is also 
a continuation of the Thatcher-Reagan neoliberal policies that see government as bad and 
markets as good,” Trump’s win is “born of both neoliberalism and its rejection, at least in 
the form practiced under Barack Obama and espoused by Hillary Clinton” (Schultz, 












Table 1: Indicators of neoliberalism in China and West decade by decade  
 China  West (United States)  
1970s  Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese 
Trade Laws, Secondary 
Literature (on effects of those 
laws/extent to which labor is 
protected), the extent of 
opening up the economy  
United States Labor Laws, 
Unites States Trade Laws, 
Secondary Literature (on 
effects of those laws, extent to 
which labor is protected), the 
extent of opening up the 
economy  
1980s  Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese 
Trade Laws, Secondary 
Literature (on effects of those 
laws/extent to which labor is 
protected), the extent of 
opening up the economy  
United States Labor Laws, 
United States Trade Laws, 
Secondary Literature (on 
effects of those laws, extent to 
which labor is protected), 
Deregulation, Tax Cuts, 
Budget cuts, Labor Unions  
1990s  Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese 
Trade Laws, Secondary 
Literature (on effects of those 
laws/ extent to which labor is 
protected), International 
Dimension (Chinese 
negotiation for joining World 
Trade Organization)  
United States Labor Laws, 
United States Trade Laws, 
Secondary Literature (on 
effects of those laws, extent to 
which labor is protected), 
International Trade, 
Manufacturing Sector vs. 
Finance Sector, Financial 
Systems (IMF, World Bank),  
2000s  Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese 
Trade Laws, Secondary 
Literature (on effects of those 
laws extent to which labor is 
protected), WTO negotiations, 
International Trade, impact of 
2008 crisis  
United States Labor Laws, 
United States Trade Laws, 
Secondary Literature (on 
effects of those laws, extent to 
which labor is protected), 
International Trade, impact of 
2008 crisis  
2010s Chinese Labor Laws, Chinese 
Trade Laws, Secondary 
Literature (on effects of those 
laws, extent to which labor is 
protected), International 
Trade, Safety Net (extent to 
which China is protecting 
Chinese labor)  
United States Labor Laws, 
United States Trade Laws, 
Secondary Literature (on 
effects of those laws, extent to 
which labor is protected), 
International Trade, 




Table 1 is the general and broad framework for the indicators I will look to when 
analyzing neoliberalism in China and the West decade by decade. In the next chapter, this 
graph will be filled in with specific indicators and economic reforms.  My comparing of 
the indicators of neoliberalism in China to the indicators of neoliberalism in the United 
States in parallel begins in the 1970s since in the mid-1970s "the Keynesian impulse went 
into reverse, to be replaced by neoliberalism” (Palley, 2004, p. 2), and starting in 1979, 
Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with pragmatic market economy whose slogan 
was “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” In the 1970s decade, I will use the 
indicators of labor laws and trade laws in China and in the United States, and I will also 
examine the extent to which the economy opens up in both of these places. I will use 
secondary literature to not only show to context of labor laws, but I will also determine 
the extent to which labor is protected. 
 I will use the same indicators in the 1980s for both China and the United States 
that I used in the 1970s, but I will also look into the various policies of the United States 
regarding deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts, and labor unions since Reagan was elected 
in the 1980s and began his campaign against big government. 
 In the 1990s, I will continue to use the indicators of labor and trade laws in both 
China and the United States, but I will add an international dimension to the neoliberal 
indicators since this is the decade when China began negotiations with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the collapse of the Soviet Union along with financial 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank created an environment in the 1990s where 
world markets become more integrated and more countries adopt neoliberal policies.  
In the 2000s, along with the trade and labor laws in China and the United States, I 
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will continue to look at international indicators in China since China joins the WTO in 
the early 2000s and negotiates special conditions. I will also use the 2008 crisis as an 
indictor for China and the United States since the crisis of neoliberalism was embodied in 
the U.S financial crisis of 2008, which catalyzed cascading chains of financial crises 
across the globe (Dutta, 2015). While many Western investment banks and 
other financial firms were brought down by this crisis, China’s leadership recognized that 
the country’s high dependence on exports meant that it was acutely vulnerable to a global 
economic recession” (Lardy, 2012, p. 5). 
 In the 2010s, President Trump and the United States question the principles of 
neoliberalism that have followed for the last thirty years, so I will not only look at the 
labor and wage laws but also the extent to which labor is outsourced and policies are 
starting to change. In the 2010 decade, because China is a champion of free trade but is 
also actively trying to protect labor, I will look at the safety net they introduced in order 
to protect labor.  
In comparing the evolution of Western neoliberalism on Chinese laws paying 
attention to specific decades of phases, the sources of data I will use will include A. The secondary literature about neoliberalism in the West at specific 
times B. The different laws enacted by China in the same period C. The reports and rating of the business environment in China done by 
large Western consultancies in specific years D. Interview data from the current decade  
I will match these four sources of data with the evolution of labor and wage laws in 
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China.  
Taken together, these data will show how Chinese trade and labor laws have 
changed and developed to determine if they are becoming more deregulated with more 
free trade or more regulated with less free trade. Such development will be matched with 
policy development in key Western economies and international institutions to determine 
the extent to which the two converge.  
This thesis approaches the research questions through a qualitative process of 
textual analysis, analysis of secondary data and interview data. First, I will go through 
each trade and labor law enacted in China at the national and in some cases provincial 
level since the 1970s. This distinction between national and provincial will be examined 
closely in my research since China has the ability and leeway to have a lot of variety in 
levels of government due to their size. In such a large country with an extremely high 
population, it is very possible to adopt certain policies on one level of the government 
and adopt different policies on another level. Second, I will contextualize these laws 
within lager trends in the organization of the global political economy, drawing on 
secondary literature in geography, economic sociology, and political science. In 
particular, I will bring the Chinese literature down into decades, starting in 1979, when 
Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with pragmatic market economy. This is an 
appropriate starting place for my analysis since 1979 is also the same year in which the 
neoliberal champion Margaret Thatcher was elected prime minister in the UK. I will go 
through each decade with the aim of comparing labor and trade laws in China with 
patterns of neoliberal reforms in certain Western countries and with the policies enacted 
by the international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank.  
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Once I have analyzed China’s development of wage and labor laws on both the 
national and provincial level of government through each decade, I will embark on my 
last stage of research and analysis. Using interview data based on 15 interviews from 
General Managers, Lawyers, Trade Commissioners, Project Managers, and various other 
workers who work in Shanghai or Suzhou collected in 2013-2015 from a project titled 
“Opening the black box of the State,” which are listed in Table 2 below, I will analyze 
the perception of Chinese trade and labor by foreign entrepreneurs and seek out 
reoccurring themes.  
Based on the information gathered from the literature on the Chinese development 
of wage and labor laws and the qualitative data in the interviews, I will draw a conclusion 















Occupation  Location  
General Manager for SIT 
Manufacturing  
Suzhou 
General Manager for Giuliano 
Automotive Equipment  
Suzhou 
General Manager for FMMG Technical 
Textiles 
Suzhou  
Partner for DLA UK LLP  Shanghai  
Trade Commissioner for Italian Trade 
Commission  
Shanghai  
Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T 
International Law Firm 
Shanghai  
Head of Corporate & Institutional 
Banking for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A  
Shanghai  
Head of Italian Desk for Intesa 
Sanpaolo S.p.A 
Shanghai  
Vice Director for Administrative 
Committee of Suzhou National Hi-Tech 
Industrial Park 
Suzhou  
Regional Vice President for Strategic 
Markets  
Shanghai  
General Manager for System 
technology co. It. 
Suzhou 
Members Relational Manager for 
European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China 
Shanghai  
Cultural attaché for Italian Cultural 
Institute 
Shanghai  
China Chief Representative for China 
Representative Office in Shanghai  
Shanghai  
Project Manager for Sino-Italian 
Campus, Tongji University  
Shanghai  
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Chapter 2: Decade by Decade Analysis  
 
 
As the scholars Wang and Karl point out, “Neoliberalism, in truth, relies upon the 
strength of transnational and national polices and economies, and it depends upon a 
theory and discourse of economic formalism to establish its own discourse.” In this 
chapter, I will discuss United States economic reforms using secondary literature in order 
to discover trends in US policy. Going through the same process with China, I will 
discuss Chinese economic reforms using secondary literature before analyzing trends in 
Chinese policy. This chapter involves breaking the US and the Chinese literature down 
into decades, starting in 1970s, when Den Xiaoping combined socialist ideology with 
pragmatic market economy whose slogan was “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics."  I will analyze in parallel the key indicators of each decade in the United 
States and China, listed in Table 3, along with the trade and labor laws enacted in China 
at the national and provincial levels since the 1970s and the trade and labor laws enacted 








Table 3: Economic Reforms in China and the West Decade by Decade   
 China United States (West) 
1970s  • With Mao’s death in 1977 and 
Deng Xiaoping’s partial 
restoration to political power in 
1977, Deng Xiaoping already 
displayed a positive new 
approach 
o In 1978, increasing CCP 
support for Deng 
Xiaoping’s reformist 
agenda culminates in its 
basic acceptance by the 
11th Central Committee 
of the CCP where it was 
argued that the reforms 
should begin with 
agriculture 
o In 1979, Deng Xiaoping 
becomes Chairman of 
the Military 
Commission, and he 
criticizes dogmatic 
approaches to policy and 
favors a pragmatic 
approach 
• The restructuring of the farming 
system 
• The raising of procurement 
prices 
• The opening of rural markets 
(Guangdong and Fujian 
designated as areas open to 
foreign investment) 
• The supplying of industrial 
inputs for agricultural 
production  
• As the United States experienced 
stagflation, political leaders and 
policy makers, for the first time 
since World War II, were in 
search of serious alternative 
economic policies to Keynesian  
• In 1971, Nixon officially ended 
the US embargo on China 
• In 1978, airline deregulation 
passed 
• Three major deregulation bills 
passed through Congress: 
trucking, the Staggers Rail Act, 
and the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act 
• Carter appointed Paul Volcker in 
1979 to replace Miller as 
chairman of the Federal Reserve 
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1980s  • The decentralization of 
financial power to provincial 
governments and state owned 
enterprises  
• The institution of measures 
actively to attract foreign 
capital 
• In 1980, the establishment of 
four special economic zones 
(Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, 
and Xiamen) to facilitate the 
movement of offshore 
manufacturing facilities from 
abroad 
• In 1984, this number expanded 
when fourteen more cities 
opened up 
• The position of Hong Kong as 
an entrepôt linking East with 
West  
• By the mid-1980s the number 
of companies engaged in the 
direct export and import trade 
had increased dramatically, and 
the central government relaxed 
controls over local agencies and 
prioritized revenue creation.  
• The reforming of the enterprise 
system in 1984   
• The state restored the bonus 
system and adjusted the wage 
rate upward 
• The leadership’s decision to 
gradually adjust and decontrol 
the prices of a few products at a 
time (By 1988, prices of most 
farm products and minor daily 
use manufacturers had been 
decontrolled, but the prices of 
wages, interest rates, and 
foreign exchange rates were 
still under strict government 
control) 
• In 1988, inflation became 
rampant, and administrative 
controls were restored and 
• Following Chinese economic 
reforms of the 1980s, U.S. 
consumer goods companies were 
increasingly drawn to China 
o American companies entered 
China by forming joint 
ventures with a Chinese 
company or government 
agency 
• In, 1980, Congress passed a trade 
agreement conferring contingent 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
status on China 
• Ronald Reagan took office in 
1981 
• Reagan four priorities for 
economic policy: increased 
deregulation and market 
liberalization, tighter control of 
the money supply, tax cuts, and 
cuts in public spending  
• Lifting of the remaining controls 
on oil and petrol that had been in 
place since Nixon’s 
administration and the reducing 
of taxes on their profits to address 
the energy crisis 
• The air traffic controllers’ strike 
of the summer of 1981  
• The large-scale tax cuts in 1981 
• The devaluation of labor power 
and the steady relative 
degradation in the condition of 
the working class, which put 
downward pressure upon wage 
rates and labor conditions 
everywhere  
• Shift from manufacturing towards 
financial power  
• Wave after wave of 
deindustrialization hit industry 
after industry and region after 
region within the US 
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strengthened, and price reform 
as well as other reforms were 
put on hold 
1990s  • The beginning of the 1990s: a 
slowdown of the reform 
movement.  
• Reform remained hesitant until 
some signs of revival in early 
1992  
• In 1993, Jiang Zemin was 
elected as president of the 
republic  
o This second phase of 
reform rested on 
regulatory and 
administrative 
restructuring of the 
banking, taxation and 
corporate governance 
systems, as well as 
further exposure to 
world markets through 
China’s membership in 
the WTO 
• By the mid-1990s, a new legal 
framework for labor, wages and 
workers’ contractual rights had 
been established to replace the 
system of “socialist” 
administrative regulation 
o In 1993, the Ministry of 
Labour and Social 
Security issued the 
Enterprise Minimum 
Wage Regulation 
o In 1994, the Labor Law 
which was passed laid 
down a foundation for 
• Policy changes had occurred in 
the realm of affordable housing 
and urban policy  
• Household debt sky-rocketed, 
which required that financial 
institutions both support and 
promote the debts of working 
people whose earnings were not 
increasing 
• The two Clinton terms occupied 
most of the 1990s 
• Between 1993 and 2000, the 
United States exhibited the best 
economic performance of the past 
three decades  
• Further deregulation took place in 
the electricity market and 
environmental regulation 
• Exports grew rapidly 
• Technology, competition and 
flexibility in goods and labor 
markets, and the public sector 
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workers’ legal and 
contractual rights 
o During this period, 
social conditions in 
workplaces were often 
poor, labor law 
enforcement was weak, 
with most local 
governments reportedly 
favoring business over 
migrant workers 
• Beginning in 1993, China’s 
reforms are geared towards 
competitiveness 
• In the mid 1990s, China 
reformed its financial and tax 
sectors, and opened capital, 
bonds and securities markets for 
new capital acquisition  
• In 1994, China introduced a 
major tax reform 
• The new Budget Law became 
effective in 1995 
• In 1997, the Chinese leadership 
selected 100 big state 
companies for experimenting 
privatization 
• The Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997  
• In the later 1990s, China 
initiated substantial reforms in 
the financial and fiscal sectors, 
adhering to capital markets  
• The reform of the banking 
system in 1998  
• The negotiations (between US 
and China) for China joining 
the WTO in 1999 
• Outcomes of the 1990s reforms 
o Price stability replaced 
rising inflation 
o The number of SOEs 
dwindled while the 
number of private firms 
increased 
o Increased market 
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competition sharpened 
pressure on employers 
and employees alike, 
contributing to massive 
layoffs and social 
inequity 
 
2000s  • China's admission to the WTO 
in 2001  
• The accelerating of global 
reforms of state companies in 
China, including stock 
exchange listing, buying, 
acquisition and merging, initial 
public offers, etc.  
• In 2000, CCP invited private 
entrepreneurs and rich persons 
to join the Party, and even to 
participate in the central power 
• Chinese rural zones began to 
organize democratic local 
elections  
• In 2002, Hu Jintao was elected 
General Secretary of the party 
and President of China  
• References to building a 
moderate wellbeing society, and 
creating a new situation in the 
development of socialism with 
Chinese features 
• Since 2003, China had 
surpassed the United States to 
become the country with the 
highest level of FDI inflow in 
the world.  
• Beginning of 2000s, working 
conditions in this industry were 
marked by low hourly pay, long 
and unstable working hours and 
detrimental environmental 
impacts 
• An increasing incidence of 
strikes and worker protests  
• The Chinese State responded to 
these pressures through a series 
of regulatory interventions 
• The US transformed from a 
manufacturing country to one 
focused on finance 
• The US trade deficit with China 
in 2005 and 2006 was the largest 
deficit it has ever recorded with a 
single economy in history and  
o Scholars attributed the 
deficit to job losses in the 
U.S. manufacturing sector 
and obstacles to U.S. 
exports to China  
• 2000: Bursting of the 
Dot.com/Technology Bubble  
• George W. Bush serves as 
President from January 2001-
January 2009 
• 2001: September 11 Terrorist 
Attacks  
• 2002: Stock Market Crash  
• War on Terror and Iraq War 
• 2008 Financial Crisis (the 
housing meltdown, the severe 
economic recession, and a 
significant downturn in the U.S. 
stock market) 
• In January 2009, Barack Obama’s 
presidency begins 
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o Three new labor laws 
that were passed in 
2007: The Employment 
Promotion Law, The 
Labour Dispute 
Mediation and 
Arbitration Law, The 
Labour Contract Law   
• During 2004-2008, the credit 
and fixed assets for investments 
increased excessively 
• China embarked upon a new 
phase of macro control  
• The shift of the tax policy in 
2005 from an active one to a 
cautious one, as well as 
adopting a restrictive monetary 
policy  
• China’s transforming of the 
world-level financial crisis into 
an opportunity 
• The increase of citizen’s 
participative role 
• The establishing a new social 
security system, in order to 
ensure workers’ rights, and 
protect them against market 
dysfunction 
• Reforming the pension system, 
and preparing for importing 
foreign management of pension 
funds on securities market in 
2008 
 
2010s • The ten years between 2003 and 
2012 were acclaimed as “Hu-
Wen’s New Deal,” with 
referred to the policies with the 
goal of constructing a 
“harmonious society”  
o A series of socio-
economic reforms to 
protect the rights of 
farmers and peasant 
workers 
• Migrant workers have replaced 
• Barack Obama served as 
President from Jan 2009 – Jan 
2017. 
o Low wage growth and high 
job insecurity 
o Obama’s moderate fiscal 
expansion to promote 
economic recovery and falling 
unemployment  
o Moderate tax increases on 
higher income Americans 








urban workers as the key 
concern of the State’s 
employment and welfare 
policies 
• Dramatic changes both in the 
urban economy (rapid growth 
driven by export-oriented 
manufacturing) and in the rural 
economy (improvements in 
socio-economic conditions 
under the State’s new policy)  
•  A new phenomenon in the 
2010s decade: a shortage of 
rural labor willing to move to 
urban jobs 
• Xi Jinping was elected 7th 
President of the People’s 
Republic of China in March of 
2013 
o China sought to increase its 
control over state-owned 
and private enterprises  
o Made in China 2025: a plan 
announced in 2015 to 
upgrade and modernize 
China’s manufacturing in 10 
key sectors through 
extensive government 
assistance 
reform, reduce the federal 
budget deficit, and decrease 
income inequality 
• Donald Trump became President 
in Jan 2017 
o Trumponomics (trade 
protectionism, immigration 
reduction, individual and 
corporate tax reform, the 
dismantling of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, and 
the repeal of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable 
Care Act) 
o Five economic trends during 
Trump’s term (the growth of 
the American economy, US 
stocks have had a record run, 
US unemployment is falling, 
US wage levels have 
flattened, the trade deficit is 
rising) 
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Chinese Economy in the 1970s 
In pre-1978 China, the economic system was a command economy with the 
following distinctive features: government-made decisions concerning the volume and 
composition of output, its production, and distribution; the allocation of resources 
through central planning; state ownership of all means of production; and distribution of 
income based on the egalitarian principle (Galenson, 1993). Together with other mutually 
supporting political and social institutions, “the command economy has developed into an 
integrated system with a logic of its own” (Galenson, 1993, p. 12). The strength of such a 
system lies in its effectiveness in mobilizing resources and “achieving accelerated growth 
in high priority sectors within a relatively short time” (Galenson, 1993, p. 13). 
China’s economic performance record in the three decades prior to 1978 provides 
ample evidence of continued economic growth, rapid industrialization, and technological 
progress in defense-related areas, but the costs of operating a command economy in terms 
of wastes and human losses are also high, especially since China’s notable economic 
growth was achieved largely through capital formulation rather than an increase in 
productivity (Galenson, 1993). Growth of total factor productivity stagnated during the 
1960s and 1970s, and China in the later 1970s remained a low-income economy by 
World Bank standards, and its per capita GNP was the lowest among the centrally 
planned economies (Galenson, 1993). According to many assessments, the standard of 
living hardly improved since the 1950s, and it is important to highlight that the principal 
reason for China’s failure to break out of poverty was its low level of productivity and 
slow growth (Galenson, 1993).  
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In the 1970s, China can be seen as slowly opening itself up to the outside world 
and foreign trade since the two coastal provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, were 
designated as areas open to foreign investment (Galenson, 1993). But in 1977, there was 
no sign that China was about to change its economic policies or its cooperation with the 
outside world (Tisdell, 2008).  Examination of the documents of the Eleventh National 
Congress of The Communist Party of China held in 1997 demonstrates a commitment to 
past practices and policies, so it seemed that without a change in political leadership 
China would be stuck in its old economic ways (Tisdell, 2008). Credit for the change 
goes primarily to “Deng Xiaoping and subsequent Chinese leaders who have followed in 
his footsteps and have continued to develop, modify and apply his approach” (Tisdell, 
2008, p. 3). Before Mao Zedong’s death, Deng Xiaoping believed that there was a need 
for economic and social reforms in China, but his approach was rejected by the then 
leadership of the CCP (Tisdell, 2008). With Mao’s death in 1977 and Deng Xiaoping’s 
partial restoration to political power in 1977, Deng Xiaoping already displayed a positive 
new approach (Tisdell, 2008). The following events happened shorty after Deng 
Xiaoping’s partial restoration to power which made reform possible: In 1978, increasing 
CCP support for Deng Xiaoping’s reformist agenda culminates in its basic acceptance by 
the 11th Central Committee of the CCP where it was argued that the reforms should begin 
with agriculture; In 1979, Deng Xiaoping becomes Chairman of the Military 
Commission, and he criticizes dogmatic approaches to policy and favors a pragmatic 
approach (Tisdell, 2008).  
During the first phase of reform, the main objective was the restructuring of the 
farming system since the many problems confronting the leadership in the immediate 
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post-Mao era concerned agricultural stagnation (Galenson, 1993). As evidence of the 
extent of agricultural stagnation, during the period 1952-1978, net agricultural output 
grew at only 1.8 percent per year while the population grew two percent per year over the 
same period (Galenson, 1993). The primary cause of the problem “was not the slower 
growth of labor or capital input but the inefficient use of these inputs due to the peasants’ 
lack of incentives under the commune system” (Galenson, 1993, p. 12). Another reason 
Chinese economic reforms began with agriculture was because agriculture was the 
foundation of the national economy at the time (Tisdell, 2008). In line with the views of 
Deng Xiaoping, it was agreed that economic incentives “should be incorporated in the 
economic system and that economic responsibility should be stressed” (Tisdell, 2008, p. 
8). By 1978, in order to reform the commune system, some areas introduced various 
forms of contractual arrangement. Under the contract system, “a farm household was 
obligated to use collectively owned assets, including land and means of production, and 
the autonomy to manage his own operations” (Galenson, 1993, p. 12). In effect, this 
change reduced the peasant’s marginal income tax from virtually 100 to 0 percent, which 
greatly enhanced the peasant’s incentive to produce, and output soared (Galenson, 1993). 
In terms of institutional change, the commune system was simply replaced with 
individual household farming, in which the farm households now possessed the rights to 
use the land and dispose of the income from the land, but not the right to transfer the 
lease (Galenson, 1993). The Party recognized this dramatic increase in output and 
“readily supported the movement by dismantling the commune system and by 
introducing major complementary measures such as raising procurement prices, opening 
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rural markets, and supplying industrial inputs for agricultural production” (Galenson, 
1993, p. 14).  
United States Economy in the 1970s 
 
For most of the 20th century, the basic policies that comprise today’s United 
States’ standard economic ideology would have been rejected as absurd since most 
economists had moved on to embrace Keynesian thought or some form of social 
democracy (Hickel, 2012). The idea that the "market should be allowed to make major 
social and political decisions; the idea that the State should voluntarily reduce its role in 
the economy, or that corporations should be given total freedom, that trade unions should 
be curbed and citizens given less rather than more social protection – such ideas were 
utterly foreign to the spirit of the time” (George, 1992). As the United States experienced 
stagflation (the combination of unemployment, high inflation, and low or no growth) in 
the 1970s, political leaders and policy makers, for the first time since World War II, were 
in search of serious alternative economic policies to Keynesian (Jones, 2012). 
In June 1971, Nixon officially ended the U.S. trade embargo on China, “sweeping 
aside the legal barriers which had hindered significant economic interaction between the 
two nations since 1950” (Wang, 2013, p. 2). With restrictions lifted, “U.S. companies 
were allowed to export certain non-strategic goods directly to China and haul Chinese 
cargo between non-Chinese ports” (Wang, 2013, p. 2). A signal achievement of the 
Carter presidency and one of the first supply-side reforms to be attempted was 
deregulation. Carter first sent Congress two deregulation bills on trucking and airlines, 
which was extremely unusual coming from a Democratic Party president (Jones, 2012). 
In October 1978, airline deregulation passed, and in 1980, “three major deregulation bills 
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passed through Congress: trucking; the Staggers Rail Act, which liberalized railroad 
freight; and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, which 
gave more command over lending to savings and loans associated with mutual savings 
banks,” where the last act also abolished interest rate ceilings for banks (Jones, 2012, p. 
168).  It is important to note that Carter’s efforts at liberalization of industry and finance 
must be considered significant since they began the movement toward deregulation in the 
United States that continued until the financial crisis in 2007-2010 among policymakers, 
especially in terms of the financial markets (Jones, 2012). Even with these policy 
reforms, inflation remained the central economic policy concern during the Carter 
presidency since inflation pushed close to ten percent in 1977-1978 (Jones, 2012). With 
high interest rates and the money supply growing fast, Carter appointed Paul Volcker in 
1979 to replace Miller as chairman of the Federal Reserve, who was preserving a 
traditional Keynesian monetary expansion (Jones, 2012). Volcker chose “monetary 
aggregates as the best measure to control the money supply and ensure that people would 
understand that he was resolute in his focus on inflation” (Jones, 2012, p. 169). Volcker 
was not raising interest rates, but instead, the market was. Since he was setting a non-
inflationary path for money supply, “it enabled the Fed to do politically, during the 
transition period, what it couldn’t have done in a more direct way” (Jones, 2012, p. 170). 
In the State of the Union address in 1979, “Carter proclaimed that government could no 
longer solve people’s problems. The Left’s reforms and realizations in the environment 
of the 1970s were as fundamental as those on the radical neoliberal right: the economic 
and political crises required new responses from those that had been the staple of 
governments since the 1940s” (Jones, 2012, p. 171). 
	 48	
Chinese Economy in the 1980s 
In mid-1981, the CPC stressed the importance of striving for the modernization of 
China’s economy by “acting systematically and in a staged fashion while basing its 
development policies on the realities of Chinese conditions and the level of available 
resources in China” (Tisdell, 2008, p.10). In other words, only modest and realistic goals 
would be sought.  A major systemic change during this period was the decentralization of 
financial power to provincial governments and state owned enterprises (Galenson, 1993). 
Beginning in 1980s, provincial governments were allowed to collect funds from specific 
sources and contributed part of the revenues to the central government according to a set 
quota, or in other words, the local governments now had the power to allocate their own 
financial resources (Galenson, 1993). Similarly, the enterprises were allowed to retain a 
portion of their profits for their own use, and the rationale behind this policy was “based 
on the leadership’s perception that the most serious defect of this command economy was 
the over centralization of decision-making power” (Galenson, 1993, p. 17). By delegating 
power and providing financial incentives to the local governments and producers, the 
leadership hoped to revitalize their initiatives (Galenson, 1993). Another key change 
during this period was the gradual relaxation of restrictions on the growth of non-state 
business, especially since the early 1980s witnessed a marked increase in the share of 
output of these organizations, particularly in the service sector (Galenson, 1993).  
 While two Chinese provinces were opened up to the world during the 1970s, the 
1980s expanded upon this opening of the semi-closed economy. In addition to “various 
institutional changes to expand external trade, the government instituted measures 
actively to attract foreign capital” (Galenson, 1993, p. 18). In 1980, the government 
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established four special economic zones, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen, to 
facilitate the movement of offshore manufacturing facilities from abroad, and in 1984, 
this number expanded when fourteen more cities opened up (Galenson, 1993).  
The 1980s witnessed the restructuring of the Chinese domestic economy, 
coinciding with China’s opening to the outside world, and “here the position of Hong 
Kong as an entrepôt linking East with West was crucial” (Wang, 2013, p. 4). A key step 
involved “harnessing Hong Kong’s trading power in world markets by encouraging Hong 
Kong firms to sign export processing contracts with businesses in China’s newly 
established Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces” (Wang, 2013, 
p. 4). By the mid-1980s the number of companies engaged in the direct export and import 
trade had increased dramatically, and “the central government relaxed controls over local 
agencies and prioritized revenue creation. Government tax incentives to both domestic 
and foreign investors virtually turned China’s entire littoral into a lucrative export-
processing zone” (Wang, 2013, p. 4).  
The reforming of the enterprise system is another key event that took place in this 
decade. The issuing by the CCP of the document “On Reform of Economic Structures” in 
1984 marked an important milestone in the strengthening of China’s economic reforms 
and their extension (Tisdell, 2008). It was agreed that “following the success of China’s 
rural economic reforms, similar reforms should be extended to the whole economy with 
the focus now being placed on the urban economy” (Tisdell, 2008, p. 10). In short, The 
Party shifted its attention from rural to urban areas. The urban reform program “outlined 
in the Party’s Decision in 1984 and the 7th Five-Year Plan had three main tasks: to 
transform the state-owned enterprises from being the administrative subsidiaries of the 
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state into independent businesses firms capable of making their own management 
decisions and responsible for their own profits and losses, to develop a competitive 
market system, and to institute macroeconomic controls” (Galenson, 1993, p. 19). By 
continuing and extending reforms, “it was hoped to establish a dynamic economy, 
invigorate enterprises and establish an economic system in which economic activity and 
production would be responsive to economic values” (Tisdell, 2008, p. 10).   
The focus was on enterprise reform. As the former Party chief Zhao Ziyang 
admitted, “inefficiency in the state-owned enterprise was a widespread problem and the 
underlying cause was the enterprise manager’s lack of initiative” (Galenson, 1993, p 20). 
In order to revitalize the enterprises, the state instituted the following: “the director 
responsibility system under which the enterprise director, rather than the Party secretary, 
had the management authority and responsibility; the contract management system, 
whereby the enterprise director entered into a contract with the state that obligated him to 
deliver a fixed amount of profit to the state, thus linking the enterprise’s marginal returns 
to management performance; and a bankruptcy law, the penalize managers who 
performed poorly” (Galenson, 1993, p. 20). 
 While in the period from 1952-1978, real wages hardly increased, workers 
enjoyed permanent job security, and not surprisingly, the workers had no incentive to 
work hard, so during the period from 1978-1984, “the state restored the bonus system and 
adjusted the wage rate upward” (Galenson, 1993, p. 21). Since 1984, the state went 
further by “removing the limit of bonuses, linking the enterprise’s total wages to profits 
turned over to the state budget, and promoting some labor mobility by establishing the 
contract labor system, labor markets in some cities, and the authority of the enterprise 
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managers to hire and discharge workers” (Galenson, 1993, p. 21). Along with the reforms 
in production management, the distribution system also went through important changes 
(Galenson, 1993). The state loosened its almost complete control over distribution by 
allowing more and more items, including some major producer goods like steel, coal, and 
cement to be traded on markets (after the producing enterprise delivered its quota to the 
state), and overall, the number of trading centers, wholesale markets, rural markets, and 
retailers increased sharply (Galenson, 1993). A great amount of progress had been made, 
and by 1998, over eighty percent of the state owned enterprises had adopted the director 
responsibility system and the contract system (Galenson, 1993). As a result, “the number 
of producer goods directly distributed by the state dropped from 256 in 1980 to 27 in 
1985; and a large portion of the newly employed workers was on contract basis” 
(Galenson, 1993, p. 22).  
Despite this progress, there was still a lack of a competitive price system 
(Galenson, 1993). Given a set of distorted prices, “there could be no meaningful 
measures of economic efficiency, thus making it impossible to enforce financial 
responsibility” (Galenson, 1993, p. 23). For example, the procurement prices for 
agricultural prices were too low, as well as the charges for transportation, public utilities, 
and housing, and the prices of manufactured products were high relative to those of 
energy and raw materials (Galenson, 1993). The Chinese leadership was well aware that 
relative prices were seriously distorted, and the questions revolved around how to correct 
the distortion and how fast the reforms should be made (Galenson, 1993). Ultimately, the 
leadership’s decision was gradually to adjust and decontrol the prices of a few products at 
a time (Galenson, 1993). Up to the mid 1980s, price reform consisted mainly of price 
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adjustments, and subsequently, the emphasis shifted to decontrolling the prices; the 
outcome of the piecemeal approach was a mixed price system (Galenson, 1993). By 
1988, prices of most farm products and minor daily use manufacturers had been 
decontrolled, but the prices of wages, interest rates, and foreign exchange rates were still 
under strict government control (Galenson, 1993).  
 During the 1980s, price reform complicated the situation. For decades, repressed 
inflation had existed, and upward price adjustments and price decontrol simply brought 
the repressed inflation to the open, creating expectations of price increases whenever 
price reform took place (Galenson, 1993). In 1988, the Party decided to push ahead with 
price reform despite mounting inflation (Galenson, 1993). However, in September 1988, 
inflation became rampant, and the leadership abandoned the plan for price reform; the 
policy focus “now shifted to the improvement of the economic environment and 
rectification of the economic order,” essentially meaning curbing inflation and checking 
corruption (Galenson, 1993) For those purposes, administrative controls were restored 
and strengthened, and price reform as well as other reforms were put on hold (Galenson, 
1993). 
 
United States Economy in the 1980s 
 
Following Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s, U.S. consumer goods 
companies were increasingly drawn to China, and “American companies entered the 
country by forming joint ventures with a Chinese company or government agency” 
(Wang, 2013, p. 4).  For example, early participants included such giants as H. J. Heinz, 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, Coca-Cola, American Express, American Motors, AMF, Inc., 
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General Foods, Beatrice, Gillette, Pepsi-Cola, Eastman Kodak, AT&T, Nabisco, and Bell 
South (Wang, 2013). On January 24, 1980, Congress passed a trade agreement 
“conferring contingent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status on China,” which “exempted 
Chinese exports to the United States from the high tariff rates stipulated by the Smoot-
Hawley Act of June 1930, a measure that was long used to distinguish friends from foes 
among U.S. trading partners” (Wang, 2013, p. 3).  
When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he had four priorities for economic 
policy including increased deregulation and market liberalization, tighter control of the 
money supply, tax cuts, and cuts in public spending (Jones, 2012). Like President Carter, 
“with monetary policy in the hands of Paul Volcker’s Federal Reserve, the administration 
centered mainly on supply-side reforms” (Jones, 2012, p. 177). The first reform Reagan 
made upon entering office was lifting the remaining controls on oil and petrol that had 
been in place since Nixon’s administration and reducing taxes on their profits to address 
the energy crisis (Jones 2012). There were also two other major events in Reagan’s first 
year that helped define the president’s economic program: the air traffic controllers’ 
strike of the summer of 1981 and the passage of a series of large-scale cuts through 
Congress (Jones, 2012). The large-scale tax cuts came about from a legislative process 
that began in 1981: the top rate of taxation was reduced successively from 70 percent to 
50 percent and then to 28 percent in 1986 (Jones, 2012). Reagan signed into law what 
were then the largest tax cuts in American history, and this bill “contributed to the 
spiraling of the federal deficit, which expanded from $700 billion in 1981 to over $3 
trillion by the time Regan left office” (Jones, 2012, p. 178). The air traffic controllers’ 
strike led the administration to successfully bust the union and fire all striking workers. 
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This event was extremely significant because busting the union, PATCO, and firing 
striking workers “entailed shifting the balance of power and interests within the 
bourgeoisie from production activities to institutions of finance capital” (Harvey, 2003, p. 
65). Financial power could be used to discipline working-class movements, and when the 
opportunity arose to launch “a frontal assault on the power of labor and to diminish the 
role of its institutions in the political process,” President Reagan's first move was to 
destroy the strong collective power of the air traffic controllers (PATCO), which served 
notice on the union movement that it “stood to suffer the same fate should any other 
group of workers strike” (Harvey, 2003, p. 65). The subsequent devaluation of labor 
power and the steady relative degradation in the condition of the working class put 
downward pressure upon wage rates and labor conditions everywhere (Harvey, 2003).  
Reductions in the "cost of transport, coupled with political shifts on the part of 
governments at all levels to offer a positive business climate and to cover some of the 
fixed costs of relocation, promoted the kind of geographical mobility of manufacturing 
capital that the increasingly hyper-mobile financial capital could feed upon” (Harvey, 
2003, p. 64). While the shift towards financial power brought great direct benefits to the 
United States, "the effects upon its own industrial structure were nothing short of 
traumatic, if not catastrophic” (Harvey, 2003, p. 64). It is important to note that offshore 
production became possible and the search for profit made it probable (Harvey, 2003). 
Wave after wave of deindustrialization "hit industry after industry and region after region 
within the US, beginning with the low-value-added goods (such as textiles), but step by 
step ratcheting up the value-added scale through sectors such as steel and shipbuilding to 
high-tech imports” (Harvey, 2003, p. 64-65). The US was “complicit in undermining its 
	 55	
dominance in manufacturing by unleashing the powers of finance throughout the globe” 
(Harvey, 2003, p. 65). Into the slums, “favelas and ghettos of insalubrious cities, tried to 
get by on less than $2 a day. Awash with surplus capital, US-based corporations actually 
began to offshore production in the mid-1960s, but this movement only gathered steam a 
decade later” (Harvey, 2012, p. 15). Thereafter, parts made almost anywhere in the 
world, preferably where labor and raw materials were cheaper, could be brought to the 
United States and assembled for final sale close to the market (Harvey, 2012). Because 
“the global car and the global television set became a standard item by the 1980s,” capital 
now had access to the whole world’s low-cost labor supplies, and “to top it all, the 
collapse of communism, dramatically in the ex-Soviet Bloc and gradually in China, then 
added some 2 billion people to the global wage labor force” (Harvey, 2012, p. 15).  While 
the benefit was cheaper goods from elsewhere to fuel the endless consumerism to which 
the US was committed, “US dependency on foreign trade was on the rise and the need to 
build and protect asymmetrical trade relations moved to the fore as a key objective of 
political power” (Harvey, 2003, p. 65).  
 
Chinese Economy in the 1990s 
The beginning of the 1990s saw a slowdown of the reform movement.  
In October 1988, “Li Peng, the new premier, announced that reforms in the next two 
years would be slow” (Galenson, 1993, p. 25). Several reform programs initiated by the 
former Party secretary had been scrapped, and new measures to tighten government 
control over a wide range of economic activities had been introduced (Galenson, 1993). 
Despite repeated “lip service to deepen reform, the reform movement slowed to a halt,” 
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and the on-going reforms consisted largely of experiments in some cities and the 
provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and Haninan (Galenson, 1993, p. 25). Toward the end 
of 1990, inflation was brought under control, but the pace of reform remained hesitant 
until some signs of revival in early 1992 (Galenson, 1993).  
Despite the slowdown of reforms in the early 1900s, Deng Xiaoping’s influence 
on China’s development policies continued both directly an indirectly. In 1992, “China’s 
transition to a market-oriented economy moved into high gear, symbolized by Deng 
Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” of Shenzhen and other Special Economic Zones in South 
China” (Wang, 2013, p. 6). He toured the south of China and gave speeches to assure 
China and the rest of the world that China’s market reforms and open-door policies 
initiated by him would continue (Tisdell, 2008). After Deng Xiaoping’s death, China 
continued on the development path that he had pioneered since Deng’s strong 
endorsement provided the momentum for a new phase of economic reform (Wang, 2013). 
In 1993, after the XIV National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which 
“entered history as the first congress to establish the target of building a socialist market 
economy in China”, Jiang Zemin was elected as president of the republic (Micu, 2016, p. 
124). This second phase of reform, led by Jiang Zemin, “rested on regulatory and 
administrative restructuring of the banking, taxation and corporate governance systems, 
as well as further exposure to world markets through China’s membership in the WTO” 
(Wang, 2013, p. 6). China’s strong commitment to reform yielded multiple outcomes: 
“price stability replaced rising inflation; the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
dwindled while the number of private firms increased, so that the latter employed twice 
as many workers as the SOEs by the end of 2004; and increased market competition 
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sharpened pressure on employers and employees alike, contributing to massive layoffs 
and social inequity” (Wang, 2013, p. 7) 
Beginning in 1993, China’s reforms are geared towards competitiveness, concerns 
regarding the quality of economic growth, and reconstructing the rule of law (Micu, 
2016). In the mid 1990s, China reformed its financial and tax sectors, and opened capital, 
bonds and securities markets for new capital acquisition (Micu, 2016). Also, the state 
“tried to transfer funds attracted from the banking sector on capital and securities 
markets, and, in the last part of this period, it tried to extend its income base by emitting 
M2 monetary supply and initial public offers, thus preparing for currency convertibility, 
majoring the foreign shareholders’ capital in some fundamental industries, and adopting 
flexible monetary and commercial policies, including floating interest rates and exchange 
rates, etc” (Micu, 2016, p. 131). All these measures have been supported by aggressive 
reforms of the tax and financial systems, in order to reinforce market competition in the 
global space, and to stimulate free circulation, facilitating the accumulation of physical 
capital. In 1994, China introduced a major tax reform, which established a clear 
distinction between national and local taxes, established a national tax agency, and local 
tax agencies, each being responsible for its own tax collection, and transformed value-
added tax (VAT) into the main indirect tax collected by the central administration, and 
shared by local administrations in a fixed quota of 75/25 (Micu, 2016). This reform was 
key since China had no national tax agency before this form, and all taxes were 
previously collected by local administrations, which frequently reduced or eliminated 
taxes that should have been paid to the central administration (Micu, 2016). The tax 
reform made it difficult for local administrations to reduce national taxes as they did in 
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the past, introduced a series of fixed tax target figures between national and local 
administrations, and led to the reduction of local budget income quota in official 
budgetary and extra budgetary accounts (Micu, 2016). 
These aggressive reforms of the tax and financial system previously mentioned 
began with the privatization of the state sector beginning in 1994. In 1994, this included 
the privatization of small and medium state companies at local levels, and in 1997, the 
Chinese leadership selected 100 big state companies for experimenting privatization 
(Micu, 2016). Still, “the long-term problems of privatization in China are deep-rooted in 
entrepreneurial culture, due to the lack of transparency and transparency stimulation in 
state companies” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). So, as privatization in China is continuing to 
“destroy the predominance and monopoly of state companies, judicial system reforms are 
beginning to play a fundamental role” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). In March 1999, China’s 
Constitution has been again modified, which is the fourth change since 1982 (Micu, 
2016). Overall, both private property and rule of law have been officially integrated into 
the Constitution, “underlining that private companies are a compulsory component of 
China’s economy” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). 
In 1995, China began taking compensation measures and making additional 
structural adjustments at market relationships between demand and offer level (Micu, 
2016). It was at this time that China rethought budgetary plans and investments structure 
as well as suspending overproduction projects (Micu, 2016). The new Budget Law 
became effective in 1995, which prohibited the central administration from making 
overdraft at the central bank and financing by deficit the current account. “The central 
administration could finance by deficit its capital account, but financing had to be 
	 59	
obtained from governmental bonds. For local administrations, the requirements were 
even more severe. No matter of their level, local administrations had to have a balanced 
budget, and, besides that, the law strictly controlled bond emission, and restricted the 
loans given to local administration on the financial market” (Micu, 2016, p. 124).  During 
1991-1997, “China followed restrictive monetary and tax policies, interest rates have 
been reduced, the money flow on the market was extended in order to revitalize 
economy, but inflation rate registered a record, reaching 21,7% in 1994. The government 
succeeded to bridle price boost, by maintaining the increase of money offer and the tax 
expenses at a moderate level” (Micu, 2016, p. 124). In the later 1990s, China initiated 
substantial reforms in the financial and fiscal sectors, adhering to capital markets (Micu, 
2016). The reform of the banking system in 1998 transformed bank property “through 
swap programs of transforming debts into capital, by means of acquisitions and merges, 
allowing foreign companies to penetrate the banking services, opening the internal 
interbank market, and introducing regulating demarcation between banks, insurance 
companies and brokers” (Micu, 2016, p. 130). Along with the financial system reform, 
there was a fiscal system reform in 1998 in order to counteract deflation by stimulating 
market demand and mass consumption. In 1998, China imposed a tax exemption for main 
import capital products and investment funds (Micu, 2016). The reforms of the 1990s 
also revolved around rationalization of the regulating frame, for transparency, justice, and 
cohesion, especially with the creating of the Securities Regulatory Commission (CRSC) 
in 1993, extending fraud investigations, and restructuring the financial sector and system 
(Micu, 2016). China’s reforms also concerned the building of the rule of law with the 
reinforcing of disclosure requirements for companies listed at the stock exchange and 
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introducing standards and regulations for telecommunication and technology encryption 
(Micu, 2016). A key Chinese reform that began in 1995 and extends through today was 
China’s extending of their financing sources and the income base. The state 
accomplished this through attracting funds through initial public offers and market 
recapitalization (bonds, securities, shares, treasury bills, insurances, etc). Lastly, the end 
of the 1990s decade was witness to the rigorous restructuration of industries in China 
with the open competition in fundamental economic sectors and introducing stimulants 
for telecommunication and Internet owners for foreign investors.  
China’s current labor regulation framework began to develop during the post-
1978 reform period, and by the mid-1990s, a “new legal framework for labor, wages and 
workers’ contractual rights had been established to replace the system of “socialist” 
administrative regulation” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518). In 1993, the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security issued the “Enterprise Minimum Wage Regulation” (Chan 
and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518), and in 1994, the Labour Law which was passed “laid down a 
foundation for workers’ legal and contractual rights, a mechanism for solving labour 
disputes, and a system of collective consultation and contracting between enterprise trade 
unions affiliated to the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and 
management” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518). The 1994 Labour Law established fixed 
term contracts as normal, but tenuous employment security was “accompanied by a 
situation where social conditions in workplaces were often poor, especially for migrants 
and where labor law enforcement was weak, with most local governments reportedly 
favoring business over migrant workers” (Pyke and Lund-Thomsen, 2016, p. 57).  Local 
governments competed with one another to lower labour wages and standards “in order to 
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attract inward investors, with local governments turning ‘a blind eye to violations of 
China's own labor regulations and laws” (Pyke and Lund-Thomsen, 2016, p. 57). 
Because of this law, “migrant workers suffered restrictions on their ability to exercise exit 
strategies by changing employers if they did not like conditions and were prohibited by 
laws in accessing social benefits” (Pyke and Lund-Thomsen, 2016, p. 57).  During this 
period, most of China’s labor legislation was concerned with individual rights and could 
not address the growing problem of conflict over collective interests (Chan and Nadvi, 
2014, p. 518). This means that even though a framework of “collective consultation” was 
technically put in place in 1994, independent trade unions were not allowed, and  
“without an effective trade union to represent workers’ interests the system of collective 
consultation and contracting” could not be implemented (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518) 
Also, many of the individual rights protected in labor laws are were not always enforced 
since local authorities could be passive on enforcement, and workers were often “paid 
below the legal minimum due to patron–client relations between local government 
officials and business” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 518).  Overall, during this decade, 
“there were serious issues regarding the efficacy of trade unions in China in protecting 
members’ interests since there were laws limiting the establishment of independent trade 
unions or the right to strike,” and “it seems a particular set of labor regulations together 
with weak enforcement enabled the pursuit of an economic strategy of ‘growth at all 
costs’, the costs being poor environmental and social conditions” (Pyke and Lund-
Thomsen, 2016, p. 57). 
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 is a key event in the 1990s decade. In sum, 
this financial crisis affected many Asian countries, including South Korea, Thailand, 
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Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. After “posting some of the most 
impressive growth rates in the world at the time, the so-called tiger economies saw their 
stock markets and currencies lost about 70% of their value” (Kuepper, 2017).  
During 1998-2003, China adopted an active tax policy and a “prudent” monetary policy, 
in order to counteract the effects of the financial crisis in Asia (Micu, 2016). The 
measures “targeted the increase of income for persons with reduced fruition, stimulating 
mainly the internal demand. As it reduced interest rates, the government began to tax 
deposit interests, and to adjust money demand through open market operations of the 
central bank” (Micu, 2016, p. 124). The government also reacted to the crisis and 
intervened by reducing its own expenses, contracting more debts for financing 
investments into infrastructure (Micu, 2016).  
On November 15, 1999, the United States and China finally signed a landmark 
agreement on China's accession to the WTO (Fewsmith, 1999).  But, the negotiations for 
China joining the WTO between China and the United States were rather complicated. 
Chinese leaders in favor of China's greater integration into the world economy were 
“thrown on the defensive in April by the U.S. rejection of China's unprecedentedly 
forthcoming offer for joining the World Trade Organization and by the bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May” (Fewsmith, 1999). The events of April and May 
raised the WTO issue from “the already difficult arena of bureaucratic politics to the 
often brutal realm of elite politics” (Fewsmith, 1999). President Jiang Zemin came under 
attack by nationalistic opposition leaders for being soft on the United States, so Jiang has 
spent much of the time since then defending himself and rebuilding support for joining 
the WTO (Fewsmith, 1999). The Clinton Administration, realizing its miscalculation in 
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April, “similarly spent the next six months working to repair U.S.-China relations in 
order to bring China back to the negotiating table” (Fewsmith, 1999). Without the efforts 
from both China and the United States “to repair the damage done in the spring, an 
agreement would have been delayed indefinitely” (Fewsmith, 1999). The agreement on 
China's entry into the WTO was as a major step in bringing China into the world, helped 
stabilize China's relations with the major powers, and reinforced domestic reform that 
lead China to play an increasingly constructive role in world affairs (Fewsmith, 1999). 
 
United States Economy in the 1990s 
 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, important policy changes had occurred in the 
realm of affordable housing and urban policy (Jones, 2012). While President Carter had 
continued the shift toward an increased role for the private sector in addressing housing 
needs, Reagan went much further, and his administration completed the federal 
government’s withdrawal from public housing during the 1980s (Jones, 2012). In sum, 
“the Reagan administration had success in driving back what remained of the 
government commitment to public provision of affordable housing. But the affordability 
crises had not been solved by the turn to the private sector. In fact, the opposite had 
occurred” (Jones, 2012, p. 203). Whatever attempts were made by Republican and 
Conservative administrations to encourage the private sector to provide low-income 
accommodation in the for-profit rental sector clearly failed since reliance on market 
based-solutions did not resolve the sever issues of homelessness, poverty, and heath in 
many communities in the United States (Jones, 2012). Without state intervention “to 
ensure the right level of provision according to the need, the crisis worsened as the 
	 64	
1990s wore on” since “empowerment and rights and responsibilities were to be 
combined with markets and public/private/voluntary sector partnerships in mixed-tenure 
neighborhoods” (Jones, 2012, p. 203). 
The gap between “what labor was earning and what it could spend was covered 
by the rise of the credit card industry and increasing indebtedness” (Harvey, 2012, p. 
16). Household debt sky-rocketed, which required that financial institutions both support 
and promote the debts of working people whose earnings were not increasing (Harvey, 
2012). While this started with the steadily employed population, by the late 1990s, it had 
to go further because that market was exhausted, and the market had to be extended to 
those with lower incomes (Harvey, 2012). Political pressure was put on “financial 
institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to loosen the credit strings for everyone,” 
so “financial institutions, awash with credit, began to debt-finance people who had no 
steady income” (Harvey, 2012, p. 16). Harvey makes a great point in by pointing out, “If 
that had not happened, then who would have bought all the new houses and 
condominiums the debt-financed property developers were building?” (16). Overall, 
“the demand problem was temporarily bridged with respect to housing by debt-financing 
the developers as well as the buyers. The financial institutions collectively controlled 
both the supply of, and demand for, housing” (Harvey, 2012, p. 16).  
The two Clinton terms occupied most of the 1990s, and between 1993 and 2000, 
the United States exhibited the best economic performance of the past three decades 
(Frankel and Orszag, 2001). During Clinton’s second term, real economic growth 
averaged 4 1⁄2 percent per year, and unemployment fell to four percent, but during the 
early 1990s, economists would have considered these outcomes unattainable. Strong 
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growth and low unemployment were accompanied by structural budget surpluses and 
low inflation, and this economic boom was led by private-sector spending and private-
sector employment (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). During this period, some observers 
found cause for concern in various aspects of economic performance since “personal 
bankruptcies climbed, the personal saving rate plummeted (as measured in the national 
income statistics), the trade deficit expanded dramatically, and the stock market may 
well have become substantially overvalued,” (Frank and Orszag, 2001, p. 3) but overall, 
however, U.S. economic performance during the 1990s was outstanding.  
Many of the most fundamental factors in explaining U.S. economic performance 
during the 1990s stretch back over two decades or more, and such factors include 
deregulation, globalization, and innovation (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Deregulation in 
the United States for the past 25 years witnessed important further steps toward 
deregulation. As previous discussed in the other decades, the deregulation trend began 
during the Carter Administration, in trucking, airlines, natural gas, and banking, and 
during the Reagan Administration, deregulation was extended to the telecommunications 
sector (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). During this period, further deregulation took place in 
the electricity market and environmental regulation, and while some of these 
deregulation efforts have faced bumps in the road, particularly banking and electricity, 
the overall effect of deregulation has been to make the U.S. economy more efficient in 
the long run (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Globalization is another fundamental factor in 
explaining the United States economic boom in the 1990s. Exports grew rapidly, “a 
major selling point for free trade policy,” and “even the increases in imports and in the 
trade deficit during the 1990s, though politically unpopular, were a useful safety valve 
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during the strongest phase of the U.S. expansion” since “they released pressure from 
rapidly growing domestic demand, pressure that would otherwise have shown up as 
higher inflation and interest rates” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 10). The third factor 
contributing to the economic boom was Innovation, which “can be further divided into 
three types: technology, competition and flexibility in goods and labor markets, and the 
public sector” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 10). Technological innovation, especially 
information technology, received much attention during the 1990s, and “although the IT 
revolution was not the sole reason for strong U.S. economic performance in the 1990s, it 
certainly was a positive factor” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 11). On another note, the 
United States has always had relatively competitive goods and labor markets, but “the 
last two decades have seen a further movement in this direction, including the initially 
unpopular corporate restructuring of the 1980s and the initially popular dot-com start-up 
firms of the 1990s” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 11). The final category is “innovation 
in the public sector. Public- sector reforms include reinventing government and defense 
reconversion, which have allowed previously low-productivity resources to be shifted to 
more productive uses, and welfare reform” (Frankel and Orszag, 2001, p. 11). 
 
Chinese Economy in the 2000s 
After China's admission to the WTO, “privatization became even more 
complicated, because it had to face a global acerbic competition” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). In 
fact, some transnational companies “intended to give up financial services and joint 
partnerships with China, because of even higher risks and costs associated to capital 
investments” (Micu, 2016, p. 125). Because of this, China’s pressure towards 
privatization reflects the new urgency of observing WTO international standards (Micu, 
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2016). China’s reforming elite actively used “its admission to WTO for generating a new 
blow regarding additional reforms, reinforcing “The law of companies”, diversifying the 
property structure of large-scale state companies, and building modern structures of 
corporate governance in China” (Micu, 2016, p. 125).   
The 2000s decade marked the accelerating of global reforms of state companies in 
China, including stock exchange listing, buying, acquisition and merging, initial public 
offers, etc (Micu, 2016). In 2000, Chinese president Jiang Zemin announced his own 
doctrine of “Three Represents”, declaring that “CCP invited private entrepreneurs and 
rich persons to join the Party, and even to participate in the central power” (Micu, 2016, 
p. 125). As its hybrid economy began to come into prominence, China drew farther and 
farther away from the previous authoritarian system (Micu, 2016). Strong evidence for 
this is the fact that some Chinese rural zones even began to organize democratic local 
elections (Micu, 2016).  
On November 15th, 2002 at the first Plenary Session of the XVI-th Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing, Hu Jintao was elected General 
Secretary of the party and President of China (Micu, 2016). During the congress, there 
were “references to building a moderate wellbeing society, and creating a new situation 
in the development of socialism with Chinese features” (Micu, 2016, p. 126).  
Although this economic system “brought China on the second place of the largest 
economies in the world, at internal level, dissatisfaction at population level is continuing, 
because the society is strongly biased, which led to the advent of such tendencies as The 
New Left; this current is composed of old-school socialists, who consider the present 
system a forced march toward market economy and private property” (Micu, 2016, p.  
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126).   
Based on this context, since president Hu Jintao came into power, he had tried to 
define himself as a left-oriented person who was “fighting hard for re-establishing 
balance at society level, taking measures in favour of poor people, and supporting the 
emergence of a solid middle class” (Micu, 2016, p. 126). In other words, Hu Jintao 
drifted away from the policies of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who allowed businessmen 
to join the Communist Party, “thus creating its look as a leader supporting politicians 
“with relationships”, while trying to acquire public properties” (Micu, 2016, p. 126).  
The 2002 and 2007 congresses debated the directions of long-term economy 
development, targeting: the activation of modernization process, the progress and 
transformation of economic structures, the improvement of socialist market economy, the 
vigorous promotion of computerization, ensuring a healthy and lasting development of 
the economy in order to continuously improve the population’s standard of living, 
development of rural economy, stimulation of urbanization process, maintaining and 
improvement of the basic economic system, and extending the reform of state properties 
administration system, deepening the reform of the income repartition system, and 
accomplishing the social protection regime, and creating new workplaces for the 
population (Micu, 2016). Going along with the economic development plans that were 
stated in the 2002 and 2007 congresses, from 2008-2013, the leadership made an effort to 
invite renown researchers from abroad to teach in universities, as well as to call back 
people born in China (Micu, 2016). The 2000s also saw an increase of the citizen’s 
participative role, especially with the establishment of a new social security system, in 
order to ensure workers’ rights, and protect them against market dysfunction (Micu, 
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2016). A few other actual events that took place in this decade and that were discussed in 
the congresses include: the reforming of the pension system, and preparing for importing 
foreign management of pension funds on securities market in 2008, continuing anti-
corruption campaigns from 2008 to 2013, and increasing tax stimuli for boosting 
economic growth and observing social security obligations from 2001 to 2009 (Micu, 
2016). During 2004-2008, the credit and fixed assets for investments increased 
excessively, and in order to stop the economy from overheating and inflation, China 
embarked upon a new phase of macro control (Micu, 2016). As a result, the authorities 
changed the tax policy in 2005 from an active one to a cautious one, as well as adopting a 
restrictive monetary policy (Micu, 2016). 
After China joined the World Trade Organization in November 2001, the growth 
rate of the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), which had been in decline since 
1994, returned to double digits (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 519).  Since 2003, “China had 
surpassed the United States to become the country with the highest level of FDI inflow in 
the world. Export-oriented manufacturers of light goods, such as toys and electronics, 
benefited from a tariff reduction after China joined the WTO, which led to rapid 
economic growth and an increase in job opportunities” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 519). 
By 2004, China had become the world’s biggest garment exporter, “with 26.6 per 
cent of global exports. The textile and garment industry accounted for 18.9 per cent of the 
country’s total manufacturing employment” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 515). However, 
working conditions in this industry were “marked by low hourly pay, long and unstable 
working hours and detrimental environmental impacts” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 515) It 
is important to note that such features were “linked to the competitive pressures within 
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the international garment industry – including persistent demands from global buyers for 
higher quality, shorter delivery times, and lower prices – and to industrial upgrading 
strategies” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 515). Because the working conditions and real 
wages of Chinese workers, especially migrant workers, were been poor, there was an 
increasing incidence of strikes and worker protests (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 524). The 
Chinese State sought to engage with and respond to these pressures, “most notably 
through a series of regulatory interventions aimed at improving the individual contractual 
rights of workers and strengthening the social floor through social insurance and pension 
provisioning” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 524). Since 2004, labor shortages and worker 
protests have resulted in substantial wage gains and improved working conditions in 
export-oriented zones, and at the level of the central government, the Chinese State has 
steadily legislated new regulations to protect the rights of workers (Chan and Nadvi, 
2014, p. 514) At the local levels of provincial, municipal and even county government, 
“researchers have also found that the extent of implementation of these labor laws has 
increased in recent years” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 514). Such developments suggest a 
“new, and generally more optimistic, perspective on the future of labor rights in China” 
(Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 514) Since 2005, minimum wage increases have generally 
been higher than inflation, indicating a rise in real wage levels, and “apart from local 
government initiatives to increase the minimum wage in locations where strike activity 
and labour activism has been most pronounced, the central Government has also sought 
to strengthen workplace regulations and legislated better labour rights in response to 
workers’ unrest” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522). Evidence of this comes in the form of 
the three new labor laws that were passed in 2007, which were the Employment 
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Promotion Law, the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and the Labour 
Contract Law (Chan and Nadvi, 2014).  In sum, “the Employment Promotion Law 
provided county governments with guidelines on monitoring employment agencies and 
facilitating vocational training,” “The Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law 
simplified the legal procedures for mediation and arbitration, thereby reducing their cost 
to workers in time and money,” and “The Labour Contract Law sought to stabilize and 
regulate employment relations by making written contracts a legal obligation for 
employers and clearly specifying the conditions under which employers may legally 
terminate a labour contract, the procedures they must follow and their legal 
responsibilities should they fail to do so” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522) The Labour 
Contract Law and the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law aim to regulate 
workplace relations and limit labour conflict, and the Employment Promotion Law and 
the Social Insurance Law address problems in the broader labour market (Chan and 
Nadvi, 2014, p. 522). Such developments could suggest “an end to the era of cheap 
labour in China and a relatively more optimistic future for Chinese workers, marked by 
increasing real wages, better social protection and pension benefits, and improved labour 
rights” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522).  
All of the economic changes made by the Chinese leadership in the 2000s are put 
to the test with the 2008 global financial crisis. The global economic slowdown, which 
began in 2008, had a significant impact on the Chinese economy. China’s media 
“reported in early 2009 that 20 million migrant workers had returned home after losing 
their jobs because of the financial crisis and that real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 
2008 had fallen to 6.8% year-on-year” (Morrison, 2014, p. 5). Unlike other countries 
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responding to the crisis, “the Chinese government responded by implementing a $586 
billion economic stimulus package (approved in November 2008), aimed largely a t 
funding infrastructure and loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending” 
(Morrison, 2014, p. 5). Such policies enabled China to “effectively weather the effects of 
the sharp global fall in demand for Chinese products,” and from 2008 to 2010, China’s 
real GDP growth averaged 9.7% (Morrison, 2014, p. 5). China is said to have 
transformed the world-level financial crisis into an opportunity, “by acquiring long-term 
resources from countries like Brazil, Russia, and African states” (Harvey, 2010, p. 69). 
As Harvey points out, since China possessed huge surpluses and an untroubled banking 
system easily manipulated by the central government, they had the means to act in a more 
“full-blooded Keynesian way.” The crash of export-oriented industries and the threat of 
mass unemployment and unrest in early 2009 lead the government to form a stimulus 
package where nearly $600 billion were put largely into infrastructural projects – 
“highway building on a scale that dwarfs that of the US interstate highway system of the 
1960s, new airports, vast water projects, high-speed rail lines and even whole new cities,” 
and secondly, the central government forced the banks to loosen credit for local state and 
private projects (Harvey, 2010, p. 70). Overall, China has emerged from the global 
financial crisis “faster and more successfully than anywhere else with growth rates 
quickly reviving towards 8 or even 10 percent” (Harvey, 2010, p. 70). China had 
“stimulated a partial revival in international trade and of demand for its own export goods 
(trade with Latin America has increased tenfold since 2000 and China’s investments in 
US debt have helped sustain effective demand for its low-cost products there) (Harvey, 
2010).  
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United States Economy in the 2000s 
 
In order to demonstrate how the United States had transformed from a 
manufacturing country to one focused on finance, as of the end of 2005, “only 10.7 per 
cent of all US employment was in manufacturing—down from 21.6 per cent at its height 
in 1979—in raw numbers, manufacturing employment totaled 19.426 million in 1979, 
17.263 million in 2000, and 14.232 million in 2005” (Scipes, 2009). The U.S. trade 
deficit with China in 2005 and 2006 was “the largest deficit it has ever recorded with a 
single economy in history,” and “critics attributed the deficit to a raft of factors, most of 
which related to job losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector and obstacles to U.S. exports 
to China” (Wang, 2013, p. 10). Also, “American critics emphasized the low cost of 
Chinese goods and services, arbitrary suppression of the value of the Chinese currency, 
market-access barriers, and lack of protection of intellectual property rights and 
government transparency” (Wang, 2013, p. 10).  
Not only was the United States a country primarily focused on finance rather than 
manufacturing in the 2000s, but this decade was also a tumultuous decade for the United 
States. During the first 10 years of the 21st Century, “there was a major terrorist attack, a 
housing meltdown, a severe economic recession, and a significant downturn in the U.S. 
stock market” (Jacobsen and Mather, 2010, p. 2). The Year 2000 was the year of the 
bursting of the dot.com/ technology bubble. Before the bubble burst, entrepreneurs saw 
potential in online business, and “investors were getting rich off unprofitable stocks with 
high prices and higher price/earnings ratios — firms like software companies and all 
things computer and Internet” (Peavler, 2017). But, In April of 2000, an inflation report 
caused the speculative bubble to burst and there were huge investment losses (Peavler, 
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2017). The 9/11 terrorists attacks helped shape other financial events of the decade, and 
after the awful day in September 2001, the economic climate of the United States was 
never to be the same again (Peavler, 2017). The New York Stock Exchange was shut 
down from September 10 - 17, and some estimate that there was over $60 billion in 
insurance losses alone (Peavler, 2017). Also, “approximately 18,000 small businesses 
were either displaced or destroyed in Lower Manhattan after the Twin Towers fell,” and 
“there was a buildup in homeland security on all levels” (Peavler, 2017).  Although the 
stock market rallied after post 9/11, it began to decline again in March of 2002; “The 
corporate fraud scandals, such as Enron, along with 9/11, were contributors to this loss of 
investor confidence in the stock market” (Peavler, 2017).   After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
“the War on Terror was launched in Afghanistan and the Iraq War was launched in 2003. 
The cost of these wars is ongoing. To date, the Congressional Research Service has 
approved about $944 billion for the operations overseas. This has been an incredible 
financial drain on our economy and it is impossible to know what the final cost will be” 
(Peavler, 2017).  
 In the early part of the 21st century, the U.S. housing market was booming, 
housing values were high, and just about anyone who wanted to buy a home could buy a 
home since individuals and families who, in the past, could not have qualified for a 
mortgage were able to qualify for adjustable-rate mortgages with low or no down 
payments and low initial interest rates (Peavler, 2017). Banks “made mortgage loans to 
these individuals for houses with inflated values. As the interest rates rose and their 
adjustable rate loans got more expensive, they couldn't make their mortgage payments,” 
and soon, “large financial institutions were holding portfolios of loans that were 
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worthless” (Peavler, 2017). In September of 2008, “a seemingly perfect storm of factors 
came together to form the deepest economic downturn in not only the U.S., but across the 
globe, since the Great Depression” (Peavler, 2017). The great investment banks that had 
stood on Wall Street began to collapse due to the sub-prime mortgage crisis and serious 
corporate fraud (Peavler, 2017). Even though the United States spent 60 years after the 
depression implementing policies to avoid crises, the US stumbled into a huge one with 
the 2008 crisis, and Krugman (2009) argues that this happened due to the lack of 
regulation, people finding ways around the law, and the government not really objecting 
to people finding a way around the law. Businessmen find ways around the rules through 
the legal language. They do this by establishing an organization that has some function of 
banks but not all, and therefore, they don’t register the organization as a bank and the 
rules do not apply. The crisis of 2008 was everything we have seen before all at once and 
occurred on all three levels: government level, central bank level, and federal official 
level (Krugman, 2009). In 2008, there was the problem of the real estate double paired 
with a bank run like in the great depression. Although the US had safeguards that they 
put on banks, the other financial institutions did not have these safeguards since they are 
not technically banks. As a result of the bank runs, there was not enough money in 
circulation, and therefore, a disruption of economic flows around the world since 
everyone is interconnected. During the last months of the Bush Administration, the 
federal government stepped in to bail out some of these institutions in order to keep the 
U.S. financial system afloat, but by the time the Obama Administration reached the 
White House in January of 2009, the economy had contracted and the recession had taken 
hold (Peavler, 2017).  
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Chinese Economy in the 2010s 
Although China’s economic growth in the post-reform era has been predicated on 
its export manufacturing performance, since the 2008 global economic crisis, China has 
“begun to recognize the economic importance of the domestic market and domestic 
consumption” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 530). Also,  “robust and sustained growth 
within the Chinese market has prompted Western retailers and brands to view China not 
only as a manufacturing platform but also as a key end market for industries as diverse as 
electronics, clothing, sports goods, foods and automobiles. Many Chinese producers have 
also begun to refocus their energies on the domestic market” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 
530) 
The ten years between 2003 and 2012 were acclaimed as “Hu-Wen’s New Deal” 
(Hu Wen Xin Zheng) by the media and China scholars (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). 
This referred to the policies of President Hu Jintao who took power in 2003 with the 
avowed goal of constructing a “harmonious society” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). 
Notably, they introduced a series of socio-economic reforms to protect the rights of 
farmers and peasant workers, such as when the CPP and the State Council issued a 
“Document No. 1” entitled “Opinions on Policies for Facilitating Increases in Farmers’ 
Incomes” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). The document not only focused on the 
stabilization of food production, increases in farmers’ income and infrastructural 
development in rural villages, but it also “highlighted the rights and interests of peasant 
workers, stating that “peasant workers are an important component of the production 
workforce” and therefore deserved state protection and basic civic rights” (Chan and 
Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). Since then, “migrant workers have replaced urban workers as the 
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key concern of the State’s employment and welfare policies” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 
520). These dramatic changes both in the urban economy (rapid growth driven by export-
oriented manufacturing) and in the rural economy (improvements in socio-economic 
conditions under the State’s new policy) have given rise to a new phenomenon in the 
2010s decade: “a shortage of rural labour willing to move to urban jobs,” which “stands 
in stark contrast to the tidal wave of peasant workers seen during the early 1990s” (Chan 
and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). This labour shortage “spread from Fujian province to the Pearl 
River Delta and then to the Yangtse River Delta, and eventually to the whole country” 
(Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520). The recent labour shortages reflect the desire of many 
migrant workers to seek employment nearer to home, resulting in higher levels of labour 
turnover, which, in turn, has also led to shifts of capital (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 520).  
This process has been encouraged by the State at the central and provincial levels: the 
“Go West, Go Out” policy has indeed “promoted significant relocation of labour-
intensive manufacturing facilities away from the coastal areas to inland provinces and 
abroad” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 521). These developments have generated a growing 
debate within China on “whether the labour market might result both in an increase in 
real wages and incomes for urban workers, and in additional investment in more capital- 
and knowledge intensive production” (Chan and Nadvi, 2014, p. 521).   
Xi Jinping was elected 7th President of the People’s Republic of China in March 
of 2013, and under his leadership, China sought to increase its control over state-owned 
and private enterprises (Kroeber, 2016). Nobody denies that, during 1993-2013, the 
situation in China stabilized, and the country transformed from a radical one (led by 
“proletarian dictatorship”) into a more modest state-nation (with “four modernizations”). 
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Also, the survival and success of any Chinese company, no matter whether it is owned by 
the state or not, was dependent on its performances on the market. By the 2010s decade, 
it is safe to say that China has made efforts towards integration into the global 
community (Micu, 2016, p. 125). Throughout this decade, the Chinese government has 
“made innovation a top priority in its economic planning through a number of high 
profile initiatives, such as “Made in China 2025,” a plan announced in 2015 to upgrade 
and modernize China’s manufacturing in 10 key sectors through extensive government 
assistance in order to make China a major global player in these sectors” (Morrison, 
2014, p. 5). Such measures have increasingly “raised concerns that China intends to use 
industrial policies to decrease the country’s reliance on foreign technology and eventually 




United States Economy in the 2010s 
 
Barack Obama served as President from January 2009 to January 2017. The main 
economic policies enacted under Barack Obama’s presidency were moderate tax 
increases on higher income Americans designed to fund healthcare reform, reduce the 
federal budget deficit, and decrease income inequality ("CEA 2017 Economic Report of 
the President-Chapter One-Eight Years of Recovery and Reinvestment"). His first term, 
from 2009–2013, included policies to address the global financial crisis of 2008. When 
Obama came to office in January 2009, “the United States economy was in a deep 
recession, with falling real GDP, high unemployment and rising levels of government 
borrowing” (Pettinger, 2017). In response, Obama oversaw a moderate fiscal expansion, 
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which helped to promote economic recovery and falling unemployment (Pettinger, 2017). 
While unemployment fell to pre-recession levels, the US recovery was unevenly 
distributed since median wages barely rose, which “compares to a booming stock market 
and rising corporate profit levels” (Pettinger, 2017). During this decade of low wage 
growth and high job insecurity, many workers have not felt much of a recovery in their 
wages and job security since “new jobs are increasingly in the new flexible ‘gig 
economy’ which give firms greater flexibility but offers lower wages and greater 
insecurity to workers” (Pettinger, 2017). Also, “the challenges of rapid technological 
change and increased automation of manufacturing processes have led to profound 
changes in the US labour market, which have led to higher inequality and insecurity” 
(Pettinger, 2017). 
Donald Trump became President of the United States on January 20, 2018. 
Donald Trump's signature economic policy proposals, sometimes referred to as 
“Trumponomics,” include trade protectionism, immigration reduction, individual and 
corporate tax reform, the dismantling of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, and the repeal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act  (“What is 'Trumponomics’?”).  Trump's tax reform plan was signed into law in 
December 2017, which included substantial tax cuts for higher income taxpayers and 
corporations as well as repeal of a key Obamacare element, the individual mandate 
(“What is 'Trumponomics’?”). Although his term began only a year ago, there are five 
economic trends (that explore his relationship with US growth, the labor market and 
trade) that have taken shape during his presidency (Palumbo, 2018). The first trend is the 
growth of the American economy, especially since “the latest figures, released by the US 
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Department of Commerce in December, show that it grew at an annual rate of 3.2% in the 
third quarter of 2017” (Palumbo, 2018). But, it is important to note that after the US 
central bank, “the Federal Reserve, raised interest rates for the third time in 2017 in 
December,” (Palumbo, 2018) so growth might be affected in the upcoming months. The 
second trend is that US stocks have had a record run. The Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
which follows the shares of 30 major US companies, “has risen to record highs 
throughout the past year in a run that stretches back to August 2016”, just before 
President Trump's election (Palumbo, 2018). Other US stock markets, including the 
Standard & Poor's 500 index and the Nasdaq index, have also reached historical highs. 
His supporters claim that his corporation tax cuts, passed shortly before Christmas, 
“helped to boost US shares, along with his US-centric policies, his clampdown on 
bureaucracy and his promises of infrastructure investment” (Palumbo, 2018). Thirdly, 
United States unemployment does seem to be falling, especially since unemployment is 
“down to 4.1% in December - and is close to its lowest-ever recorded level of 3.9% in 
2001”, which is “less than half the 10% peak of 2010, reached after the global financial 
crisis” (Palumbo, 2018). But, this downward trend began during President Barack 
Obama's time in office; when President Obama left office, unemployment was 4.8% 
(Palumbo, 2018). Fourthly, despite other positive economic indicators, US wage levels 
have flattened since Trump took office. Wage growth “has stayed between 2.5% and 
2.9% without showing any meaningful rise in the last 12 months” (Palumbo, 2018). 
Many economists do not have an answer as to why wage growth has been flat, but “the 
general forecast for 2018 is that wages will rise if unemployment continues to fall” 
(Palumbo, 2018). Lastly, the trade deficit is rising. While Trump has made improving US 
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trade a priority of his administration, the country's trade deficit (when imports are higher 
than exports) has actually risen to a level not seen since 2008 (Palumbo, 2018). Some 
economists claim that “part of the explanation for the deficit could be that the continued 
growth of the US economy, and an increase in consumer confidence, have led to an 
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Chapter 3: Comparison of China and the United States  
 
Analyzing the key economic reforms and indicators of neoliberalism in China and 
the United States decade by decade, from the 1970s to 2010s, led me to find surprising 
similarities in Chinese and US policies, effects of those policies that were 
complementary, and a clearly neoliberal direction in the 1980s-1990s that altered in the 
2000s-2010s for both countries.  
There was striking parallelism in the economic situation in United States and 
China in the 1970s despite the fact that the countries were completely different: China 
had a communist system of government based on the ideas of socialism and the United 
States economy was driven by the principles of capitalism. The United States 
experienced stagflation or unemployment, high inflation, and low or no growth in the 
1970s while China remained a low-income economy and its per capita GNP was the 
lowest among the centrally planned economies (Galenson, 1993). Just like China was 
seemingly committed to their economic ways in 1977, so was the United States since 
Keynesianism dominated all economic thought. Despite both countries’ commitment to 
patterns of the past, the leadership in China and the United States began to search for 
other economic alternatives around the same time. As the United States experienced 
stagflation in the 1970s, political leaders and policy makers, for the first time since World 
War II, were in search of serious alternative economic policies to Keynesian (Jones, 
2012), and similarly, in China, because of Mao’s death and the dire economic situation, 
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Deng Xiaoping believed that there was a need for economic and social reforms in China. 
Both China and the United States were moving in a clear neoliberal policy 
direction throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Elements of neoliberalism, privatization, 
deregulation, cuts in public spending, floating exchange rates, protection of property 
rights, liberalization of trade and investment, and limits to state power, can be seen in 
China and the US throughout these two decades (Xu, 2011). Following the neoliberal 
concept of limiting state power, when Deng first initiated the reform, the transformation 
of government functions was one of his priorities, and several waves of administrative 
reform in the 1980s and 90s reduced the size and responsibility of the government (Xu, 
2011). After the leadership in both countries recognized the need for change in the late 
1970s, actual reforms were implemented in the early 1980s. Both China and the US 
placed their first reforms on the most important sectors in their respective economies. 
During the first phase of reform in China, the main objective was the restructuring of the 
farming system since the many problems confronting the leadership in the immediate 
post-Mao era concerned agricultural stagnation and since agriculture was the foundation 
of the national economy at the time (Tisdell, 2008). In effect, the restructuring of the 
farming system greatly enhanced the peasant’s incentive to produce, farm households 
possessed the rights to use the land and dispose of the income from the land, and output 
soared. The Party recognized this dramatic increase in output and introduced major 
complementary measures such as raising procurement prices, opening rural markets, and 
supplying industrial inputs for agricultural production (Galenson, 1993). Deregulation in 
the United States was occurring at the same time as it was in China, just on different 
industries. In the United States, one of the first supply-side reforms to be attempted was 
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deregulation. In 1978, airline deregulation passed, and in 1980, three major deregulation 
bills passed through Congress which liberalized railroad freight, gave more command 
over lending to savings and loans associated with mutual savings banks, and abolished 
interest rate ceilings for banks (Jones, 2012).   
Both China and the United States made huge strides in the 1980s of opening up 
their countries to the rest of the world, but it is important to point out that for the United 
States opening up meant “going out” and for China this meant “coming in.” By the 
United States “going out,” I am referring to offshoring production, and by “coming in,” I 
am referring to China allowing other countries to start joint ventures or offshore 
production in China. Following Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s, U.S. consumer 
goods companies were increasingly drawn to China, and China allowed American 
companies entered the country by forming joint ventures with a Chinese company or 
government agency (Wang, 2013).  In addition to various institutional changes to expand 
external trade, the Chinese government instituted measures actively to attract foreign 
capital in the 1980s while also establishing several special economic zones to facilitate 
the movement of offshore manufacturing facilities from abroad. In the United States, 
reductions in the cost of transport paired with the government’s willingness to cover 
some of the fixed costs of relocation led to the geographical mobility of manufacturing 
capital (Harvey, 2010). In the 1980s, offshore production and the search for profit took 
off, and while US-based corporations actually began to offshore production in the mid-
1960s, this movement gathered steam in the 1980s since parts made almost anywhere in 
the world, preferably where labor and raw materials were cheaper, could be brought to 
the United States and assembled for final sale close to the market (Harvey, 2010). 
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More economic parallelism can be seen in China and the United States in the 
beginning of the 1990s since both countries experienced issues with their economies. 
Inflation was increasing in China in the beginning of 1990, and toward the end of the 
year, it was brought under control, but the pace of reform remained hesitant until some 
signs of revival in early 1992 (Galenson, 1993). In the United States, household debt sky-
rocketed, and political pressure was put on financial institutions to loosen the credit 
strings for everyone, so financial institutions began to debt-finance people who had no 
steady income (Harvey, 2010). Beginning in 1993, the economies in China and the 
United States pick up again, and both countries seem to become more aggressive with 
their reforms. Between 1993 and 2000, the United States exhibited the best economic 
performance of the past three decades (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Strong growth and 
low unemployment were accompanied by structural budget surpluses and low inflation, 
and this economic boom was led by private-sector spending and private-sector 
employment (Frankel and Orszag, 2001). Although the economy was booming, personal 
bankruptcies climbed, the personal saving rate plummeted, and the trade deficit expanded 
dramatically. Beginning in 1993, China’s reforms were geared towards competitiveness, 
concerns regarding the quality of economic growth, and reconstructing the rule of law 
(Micu, 2016). In the mid 1990s, China reformed its financial and tax sectors, and opened 
capital, bonds and securities markets for new capital acquisition (Micu, 2016). All these 
measures by the Chinese leadership were supported by aggressive reforms of the tax and 
financial systems in order to reinforce market competition in the global space, and to 
stimulate free circulation, facilitating the accumulation of physical capital (Micu, 2016). 
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The United States made major reforms to taxes beginning in the 1980s, and the 
Chinese Leadership, while initially hesitant about making major changes to tax policy, 
initiated large reforms in the 1990s.  In the United States, the large-scale tax cuts came 
about from a legislative process that began in 1981: the top rate of taxation was reduced 
successively from 70 percent to 50 percent and then to 28 percent in 1986 (Jones, 2012). 
Reagan signed into law what were then the largest tax cuts in American history, and this 
bill “contributed to the spiraling of the federal deficit, which expanded from $700 billion 
in 1981 to over $3 trillion by the time Regan left office” (Jones, 2012, p. 178).  During 
1991-1997, China followed restrictive monetary and tax policies, but in the later 1990s, 
China initiated substantial reforms in the financial and fiscal sectors, adhering to capital 
markets (Micu, 2016).  China and the United States, both competitive economies in the 
1990s opening themselves up to global markets, came together on November 15, 1999 
and sign a landmark agreement on China's accession to the WTO (Fewsmith, 1999). The 
agreement on China's entry into the WTO was as a major step in bringing China into the 
world, helped stabilize China's relations with the major powers, and reinforced domestic 
reform that lead China to play an increasingly constructive role in world affairs 
(Fewsmith, 1999). 
Parallelism between China and the United States can also be seen in the 1990s 
based on the flourishing inequality and reduced welfare for citizens. While China’s 
strong commitment to their overall economic strategy (banking, taxation, corporate 
governance system, and further exposure to the world market) yielded increased market 
competition, there was sharpened pressure on employers and employees, which 
contributed to massive layoffs and social inequity (Wang, 2013). During this decade, 
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China can be characterized as having a particular set of labour regulations coupled with 
weak enforcement which enabled the pursuit of an economic strategy of “growth at all 
costs,” the costs being poor environmental and social conditions (Pyke and Lund-
Thomsen, 2016, p. 57). Similarly, in the United States, the heavy focus on market based-
solutions only worsened the issues of homelessness and poverty in the United States 
(Jones, 2012) since “empowerment and rights and responsibilities were to be combined 
with markets and public/private/voluntary sector partnerships” (Jones, 2012, p. 215). 
Following increased deregulation and market liberalization was the subsequent 
devaluation of labor power since the steady relative degradation in the condition of the 
working class put downward pressure upon wage rates and labor conditions everywhere 
(Harvey, 2003).  
Based on Chinese policies in the 1980s-1990s, China was moving in a neoliberal 
direction due to the focus on capital accumulation, the expansion of commercial markets, 
the privileging of corporations, deregulation of labor markets, and dismantling of social 
protections, but in the 2000s-2010s, we start to see the policies alter in a different, non-
neoliberal direction. It could be said that neoliberalism in the West tends to cut the state’s 
provision of public goods and brings about severe inequality and the breakdown of social 
welfare, but the Chinese state does maintain a commitment to protect such elements for 
their citizens.  In the 2000s, Chinese rural zones began to organize democratic local 
elections, and there was an increase of the citizen’s participative role, especially with the 
establishment of a new social security system, in order to ensure workers’ rights, and 
protect them against market dysfunction (Micu, 2016). Although in 2002, Jiang Zamin, in 
his report to the 16th Congress of the CPP re-affirms China’s policies for economic 
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development, he also expresses concern about growing economic inequality in China and 
disparities in access to social services (Tisdell, 2008). While Jiang Zamin had tried to 
encourage policy to reform such inequality, Hu Jintao went further, and in his report to 
the 17th Congress of the CPP, he indicated that policy must pay more attention to China’s 
income distribution system, social services system, energy issues, and the quality of the 
environment (Tisdell, 2008). The shift in Chinese labor laws is also evidence of a 
departure from the neoliberal model, especially with the labor laws passed in 2007. The 
developments in labor laws in China in the 2000s could suggest “an end to the era of 
cheap labour in China and a relatively more optimistic future for Chinese workers” (Chan 
and Nadvi, 2014, p. 522). With the shift in labor law to increased real wages, better social 
protection, and pension benefits, China is going against a key aspect of neoliberalism: the 
process of progressive erosion of legal protections to labor.  
Although China began departing from the neoliberal model in the early 2000s 
decade, after 2008, both the United States and China began departing from the neoliberal 
model; however, the specific reforms implanted were signaling also a divergence 
between the two countries. When the global financial crisis of 2008 hit, both the United 
States and China were impacted, but the two countries handled the economic situation in 
completely different ways. While China was proactive in trying to thwart the crisis from 
negatively affecting the Chinese economy, the United States can be seen as being more 
reactive. During the last months of the Bush Administration, the federal government 
finally stepped in to bail out some of these institutions in order to keep the U.S. financial 
system afloat, but by the time the Obama Administration reached the White House in 
January of 2009, the economy had contracted and the recession had taken hold (Peavler, 
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2017). The key finding of a divergence from neoliberalism in Chinese policy becomes 
clear in the observance of the Chinese Government having major influence in the amount 
and nature of investment in China, “particularly in infrastructure and in the selection of 
key sectors for development, as well as in human capital formation and in the direction of 
scientific and technological research” (Tisdell, 2008, p. 8). Evidence of this takes shape 
in the reforms to thwart the global financial crisis of 2008 when the Chinese government 
responded by implementing a $586 billion economic stimulus package aimed largely at 
funding infrastructure and loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending 
(Morrison, 2014). Based on the policy changes in the 2000s decade, it can be argued that 
the Chinese economy has become a mixed economy in which “the CCP plays a central 
role by providing a general framework or blueprint for China’s development” (Tisdell, 
2008, p. 8).  
Both countries’ departure from the neoliberal model is evidenced by policy 
changes being adopted to enable states to reassert control over markets and the 
redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns, but these policy changes in 
China and the US are implemented in different ways. We begin to see this in the United 
States when Obama takes office in 2009 and redirects the economy towards social 
concerns by implementing moderate tax increases on higher income Americans designed 
to fund healthcare reform, reduce the federal budget deficit, and decrease income 
inequality. With Donald Trump becoming President of the United States on January 20, 
2018, so far, there is a continuing divergence from the traditional neoliberal model and a 
different kind of model is forming. One of Donald Trump's signature economic policy 
proposals is trade protectionism, a principle directly contrary to that of neoliberalism, 
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which emphasizes reducing barriers to trade. Trump’s policies also revolve around 
boosting manufacturing employment, which involves pressuring international trading 
partners to renegotiate trade deals like NAFTA and domestic businesses to keep jobs in 
the United States (Karsten, 2017). In trying to bring manufacturing back to the United 
States, President Trump has also threatened tariffs on imports of steel to protect U.S. 
producers, is seeking to lower costs for manufacturers (both by reducing the corporate tax 
rate and by rolling back existing regulations), and hoping to slash funding for existing 
training programs in favor of pressuring businesses to invest more in training for their 
own workers (Karsten, 2017). While Trump “wants to upend the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus” (Smith, 2018) by threatening to impose tariffs on American corporations that 
move their production to other countries, at the same time, he is also “doubling down on 
some aspects of neoliberalism” (Smith, 2018). This can be seen in Trump's tax reform 
plan that was signed into law in December 2017, which included “substantial tax cuts for 
higher income taxpayers and corporations as well as repeal of a key Obamacare element, 
the individual mandate” (“What is 'Trumponomics’?”). His plans to “cut taxes on the 
rich, rip up government regulations that “hamper” business interests, expand Obama’s 
fracking program to provide corporations cheaper energy, and to go after public sector 
unions” (Smith, 2018) also seem to follow the neoliberal model.   
While China in the early 2000s decade began departing from the neoliberal 
model, post 2008, the leadership further focuses on the improvement of socialist market 
economy, ensuring a healthy and lasting development of the economy in order to 
continuously improve the population’s standard of living, the development of rural 
economy, and creating new workplaces for the population (Micu, 2016). China post 2008 
	 93	
clearly makes efforts towards reasserting control over the market, and as scholar Xu 
states, “Dubbed as ‘the state advances, the private sector retreats’, this new trend has seen 
tremendous growth in the public sector both in size and profitability. From 2003 to 2009, 
the total assets of central government-controlled SOEs increased from $1.1 trillion to 
$3.2 trillion” (2011, p. 1076). The $600 billion stimulus package announced in 2008 to 
minimize the impact of the global financial crisis is also evidence of the states taking 
control of the market since the stimulus focused on housing, infrastructure and 
transportation industries, which are sectors traditionally dominated by the state (Xu 
2011). When Xi Jinping was elected President of the People’s Republic of China in 2013, 
China actively sought to increase its control over state-owned and private enterprises 
(Kroeber, 2016). Throughout the 2010s decade, the Chinese government made innovation 
a top priority in its economic planning, especially through its plan “Made in China 2025,” 
which is a plan announced in 2015 to upgrade and modernize China’s manufacturing in 
10 key sectors through extensive government assistance in order to make China a major 
global player in these sectors” (Morrison, 2014, p. 5). The key phrase in the 2025 plan is  
“extensive government assistance” which further shows the Chinese leadership 
reasserting control over markets.  
Through my analysis of the economic reforms in China and the United States 
decade by decade, from the 1970s to 2010s, I have found surprising similarities in 
Chinese and US policies, effects of those policies that were complementary, and a clear 
neoliberal direction in the 1980s-1990s in the United States and China. But, after 
analyzing Chinese and US reforms in the 2000s-2010s decades, this neoliberal direction 
shifts in both countries, and a different kind of model is taking shape in both China and 
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the US that diverges from neoliberalism since the policies being implemented throughout 
those decades run directly contrary to the core practices of neoliberalism. In the following 
chapter, I will discuss how a subset of international entrepreneurs is also experiencing 
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Chapter 4: Interviews- Impression of Foreign Entrepreneurs  
 





Occupation  Location  
General Manager for SIT Manufacturing  Suzhou 
General Manager for Giuliano Automotive 
Equipment  
Suzhou 
General Manager for FMMG Technical 
Textiles 
Suzhou  
Partner for DLA UK LLP  Shanghai  
Trade Commissioner for Italian Trade 
Commission  
Shanghai  
Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T International 
Law Firm 
Shanghai  
Head of Corporate & Institutional Banking 
for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A  
Shanghai  
Head of Italian Desk for Intesa Sanpaolo 
S.p.A 
Shanghai  
Vice Directior for Aministrative 
Committee of Suzhou National Hi-Tech 
Industrial Park 
Suzhou  
Regional Vice President for Strategic 
Markets  
Shanghai  
General Manager for System technology 
co. Itd. 
Suzhou 
Members Relational Manager for 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in 
China 
Shanghai  
Cultural attache for Italian Cultural 
Institute 
Shanghai  
China Chief Representative for China 
Representative Office in Shanghai   
Shanghai  
Project Manager for Sino-Italian Campus, 
Tongji University  
Shanghai  
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After analyzing the economic reforms in China and the United States decade by 
decade in the previous chapter, I came to the conclusion that in the 2000s-2010s decades 
the neoliberal direction shifts in both countries, and a different kind of model is taking 
shape in China and the United States that diverges from neoliberalism. In this chapter, I 
will summarize my analysis of the interview data based on 15 interviews from General 
Managers, Lawyers, Trade Commissioners, Project Managers, and various other workers 
who work in Shanghai or Suzhou, which was collected in 2013-2015 from a project titled 
“Opening the black box of the State.” Overall, my analysis of the perception of Chinese 
trade and labor by foreign entrepreneurs and suppliers of US companies provides further 
proof of my conclusion in the last chapter of China’s deviation from neoliberalism in 
recent decades since this subset of international entrepreneurs is also experiencing such a 
divergence from the neoliberal model in China.  
Unlike a typical neoliberal path which tends to cut the state’s provision of public 
goods and brings about severe inequality and the breakdown of social welfare, the 
Chinese departure from the neoliberal model can be seen in the way that the state 
maintains a commitment to protect such elements for their citizens. As addressed in the 
last chapter, in the 2000s, there was major effort put forth to ensure workers’ rights and 
protect them against market dysfunction, and post 2008, the leadership further focuses on 
the improvement of socialist market economy, ensuring a healthy and lasting 
development of the economy in order to continuously improve the population’s standard 
of living, the development of rural economy, and creating new workplaces for the 
population. In an effort to protect their citizens, economy, and well-being of the country 
as a whole, China post 2008 clearly makes efforts towards reasserting control over the 
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market, dubbed as “‘the state advances, the private sector retreats” (Xu, 2011, p. 1076). 
This theme of reasserting control over their markets, focusing on their country 
domestically, and serving the Chinese people more and more was continuously repeated 
throughout the interviews.  The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing in Suzhou 
pointed out that while China is a big market entering it is not easy since now business 
have to compete with local competitors. In the last five years, the GM has noticed that 
labor costs have increased around 10% each year and that manufacturing costs in China 
are quite high. Interestingly, the GM asserts that China wants the manufacturing costs to 
be high so that companies will relocate elsewhere where labor costs are cheaper; a clear 
plan by the central government in Beijing. This so called “Go to West” plan by the 
government is an effort to increase the standards of living in less developed parts of the 
country. The coast is very developed and the standard of living there is high, so now 
China is making an effort to develop the other less-developed parts of the country. The 
GM also addressed the notion that Chinese firms are serving the Chinese market more 
and more, and the winning strategy for these businesses is producing local to local since 
the time for low cost outsourcing is over due to the fact that costs such as labor and 
energy are growing. The interviews from the Head of Corporate & Institutional Banking 
for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A and the Head of Italian Desk for Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A also 
highlight how China is now focusing in on their internal market. These interviewees point 
out that many of their clients in the manufacturing sector over the last five years have 
started to change their strategy to manufacture for the Chinese market because the 
government “has focused on that, changing the balance of what constitutes the GDP here, 
and companies with an original view to manufacture and export to wherever have moved 
	 100	
toward manufacturing in China and for the China market. So their businesses have 
become purely domestic.” The China Chief Representative for China Representative 
Office in Shanghai’s interview also contained a similar discussion, as the representative 
stated that “China is losing its predominant position as a world exporter, wages are 
growing, it is becoming a country of consumers, and thus the cost of producing here is 
growing. Because of the growing costs and the long distances of delivery, the batches of 
exported goods are becoming smaller. Thus, in order to keep using their enormous 
industrial capacity, the Chinese government and enterprises are pushing the development 
of the internal market.” 
A key aspect of a neoliberal path is implementing policies that open up foreign 
markets, but in the most recent decades, China has closed their doors to foreign 
employees, implemented laws putting limitations on importers, closed the market in 
certain sectors, and established strict regulations on foreign companies.  
The interview from the partner for DLA UK LLP touches upon China closing off and 
creating barriers for foreign employees, and the partner states, “China is closing doors to 
foreign employees. Now they require a higher education degree and two years of work 
experience. This creates obstacles to our members, especially in manufacturing.” The 
Regional Vice President for Strategic Markets in Shanghai talked about how strictly the 
business is being regulated by China, and since the business is in the medical sector, there 
is a complex process of registration for their products, and they have to be extremely 
careful to insure compliance, as well as monitoring that the quality of our products 
remains constant. The VP identified how China is closing off their markets when stating, 
“laws are being discussed to put limitations on pure importers like us, so we are 
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discussing our next steps.” China is a lot stricter on foreign companies than their 
domestic companies, and the interviews make it evident that there is a lot of caution, 
hesitancy, and over watch around these foreign companies that do business in China.  The 
General Manager for System technology co. Itd. discussed how difficult the Chinese 
market is, pointing out that in China “laws are applied much more strictly to foreign 
companies, and thus our costs are higher…In general, China has a purely commercial 
relation with us: they buy our machines until they found a Chinese producer with a 
matching product. Part it is because of law enforcement issues: the government strictly 
controls that we issue invoices, and they are more lax with the Chinese. Part is ease of 
relationships, or even outright nationalism, part is pure cost differential.”  This discussion 
of the Chinese government making imports difficult, as well as the Chinese market itself 
being difficult is continued with the interview from the Members Relational Manager for 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. The manager states, “The market in 
China is complicated in some sectors, and completely closed in others. Publishing is 
closed to foreigners; automotive manufacturing must be up to 50% joint ventures – or 
you can import cars paying very high levies, as Ferrari does. In other sectors the 
requirements for foreigners are implicitly higher – for example, food safety regulations 
are applied more strictly to foreigners.” In the interview, the manager also address the 
Chinese laws concerning banks pointing out that access to credit in China is quite 
difficult since the Chinese banks have limits by the Chinese law on how many branches 
companies can have and how much they can loan.  In another interview, the Cultural 
attache for Italian Cultural Institute stated that the “Chinese economy is indeed a mix of 
State enterprises and private sector,” and business deals will be successful only when the 
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Chinese government is in some way involved. In China, foreigners traditionally cannot 
act independently, and foreign investments are always joint ventures with Chinese 
counterparts. As a result, the interview states “any business proposal has to be introduced 
by a local mediator.” The China Chief Representative for China Representative Office in 
Shanghai also hones in on the notion that China is very hesitant in establishing 
relationships with the foreign businesses. The representative points out how important it 
is to cultivate relationships with their Chinese partners because “once the relationship is 
established, the next step is usually to establish a small foothold in China. This often 
consists in an office in a business incubator, and hiring a Chinese salesperson that keeps 
the connections going and attends all business fairs. After a while there will be space for 
a larger investment”  
In order to minimize the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese 
government implemented a $586 billion economic stimulus package aimed largely at 
funding housing, infrastructure, and transportation industries. Such sectors are 
traditionally dominated by the state, which shows that the Chinese Government has a 
major influence in the amount and nature of investment in China. Because of the reforms 
the Chinese leadership implemented in order to thwart the global financial crisis, China 
was able to remain economically strong and minimally impacted, and the interviews also 
reflect this result. The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing in Suzhou discussed how 
the world changed after 2008, and while most manufacturing firms experienced a crisis, 
SIT actually financially improved because they kept investing in new plants. The GM 
also pointed out how proactive the Chinese government was in trying to prevent the 
financial crisis from hurting their economy in saying “working as Suzhou Working 
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Group with a far-sighted Suzhou government, we obtained financing at discounted rates 
and a one year delay in rent payments for the shed.” The General Manager for FMMG 
Technical Textiles in Suzhou also stated that “the crisis did not have a long term effect on 
this company in China, just a short term reduction of sales.” The General Manager for 
System technology co. Itd. In Suzhou contributed to this discussion of the impact of the 
crisis in China stating, “China recovered rapidly, thanks to the huge government 
stimulus,  and US took much longer.”  
After 2008, China evolves very rapidly and the interviewees point out that the 
laws and conditions have changed. The Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T International Law 
Firm hones in on these changing conditions in saying that “Chinese laws and conditions 
have changed, new kind of business is coming, not only manufacturing anymore. Now 
we work a lot with engineers, architects, and other kinds of professionals.” The lawyer 
also talks about how sector is important since “manufacturing, trading, and services need 
different kind of work because Chinese laws are different for each of those. Now very 
few new manufacturers are coming, and the other two are more important.” The 
interview expands upon his previous statements in stating that “China has recently 
changed almost everything in their laws. They made important technical changes in 
corporate laws and tax laws.” The lawyer explains that this is because when China 
realized that they attracted so many investments they changed their labor laws and made 
them much stricter. From the viewpoint of the law, the interviewee asserts that “China 
has changed from being a developing country to a developed one, from being an export 
base for wealthier countries to an internal market.” From 2000 to 2010 China opened to 
the world, but “after 2010, China, conscious of its power, normalized its laws: now 
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environmental and labor standards are much stricter, and foreigners cannot come here to 
exploit anymore.” The General Manager for FMMG Technical Textiles, in addressing the 
Chinese policies that influence the company stated, “The tax bureau and labor 
inspectorate impose on you, they are not partners. They produce new laws, they do not 
enforce them for years, and them they implement them very fast. China is evolving very 
rapidly, and it is difficult to manage.” The Regional Vice President for Strategic Markets 
also touches upon the complexity of Chinese laws. Although the company is organized in 
three sections, sales, marketing, and regulatory compliance, regulatory compliance is 
heavier than elsewhere because of the complex Chinese laws. The VP then discusses the 
rapidly evolving country stating “regulations are changing fast, following the pace of 
development. The scenario is changing every three to six months, so we need a 
permanent presence. The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing in Suzhou compares 
China before 2008 to China after 2008. The GM discusses how back in the early 2000s 
the Chinese government gave exceptional fiscal incentives, such as giving the land for 
free and building sheds for companies. SIT manufacturing paid no taxes for two years, 
and 50% for the next three years, but later, when investors reached a critical mass, the 
GM says that the Chinese government stopped the incentives. After 2008, the GM asserts 
that “the Chinese government (as a part of its decision to develop the domestic market) 
began investing billions of yuan in infrastructures: highspeed trains, highways, with the 
goal of connecting the cities of 3rd and 4th belt with the coast” and “now they are 
repeating the incentives to convince companies to move to 3rd and 4th belt cities and 
pushing cities to invest in developing the interior.” Now, as the GM says, the Chinese 
government is incentivizing reverse migration to bring the necessary skills to the new 
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industrial areas. The government is encouraging people who moved to Suzhou from the 
interior to go back through reduced income tax and promises of lower cost and lower 
pressure lives. 
In Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Congress of the CPP, he indicated that policy 
must pay more attention to energy issues, and the quality of the environment (Tisdell, 
2008), and in the interviews there was a reoccurring theme of the Chinese government 
making an effort to clean the environment. The General Manager for SIT Manufacturing 
in Suzhou discusses how back in 2004, Chinese families (in the South) did not use 
heaters, but in a decade, a sizeable middle class developed, and they wanted better living 
conditions and heated apartments. Nowadays, they use AC units and electricity that in 
China comes mostly from heavily polluting coal plants. In an effort to protect the 
environment, China has pledged to cut CO2 emissions 25% by 2020. China also started a 
national plan for clean energy. Besides wine turbines and solar, the GM says the bulk of 
lean energy will come from gas from Central Asia and Myanmar. The Trade 
Commissioner for Italian Trade Commission also discusses the environmental effort in 
China in stating that “there are new environmental policies, a strong effort to clean up the 
environment, attracting companies in that sector, urban polices (smart cities), and food 
policies focusing on healthy and affordable food that are interesting for the food 
processing industry.”  
In analyzing the interviews, I found that loyalty is an ideal that the Chinese 
leadership upholds and values. As Regional Vice President for Strategic Markets states, 
“China values companies that have been here for the long run, invested and helped the 
country to develop.” China is hesitant towards foreign companies, and based on the 
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interviews, it seems that loyalty is a key factor in China establishing a relationship with 
foreign companies. The Members Relational Manager for European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China confirms this notion in saying that “trust and respect are extremely 
important in China…they take their time, and you need to show you are working for the 
Chinese community- your employees and the tax authorities” In another interview, the 
Cultural attache for Italian Cultural Institute pointed out that “there are strong taboos that 
must be respected in China, or the relationship will break: the validity of the Chinese 
political system must not be questioned, as well as their profound veneration for 
antiquity.”  
Although China began departing from the neoliberal model in the early 2000s 
decade, after 2008, both the United States and China began departing from the neoliberal 
model; however, the specific reforms implanted were signaling also a divergence 
between the two countries. Both countries’ department from the neoliberal model is 
evidenced by policy changes being adopted to enable states to reassert control over 
markets and the redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns, but these 
policy changes in China and the US are implemented in different ways. Another theme I 
found when analyzing the interviews was the difference in business relations in China 
and the United States. The Lawyer for Zunarelli B&T International Law Firm compared 
China to the West and pointed out that “in China information generally is not public, so 
you need to connect with people even to find a budget or a balance sheet. But, in Western 
countries relationships are easy and recognizable. Here they are not, and moreover they 
must be continuously nurtured.” The lawyer further goes on to say that the most 
important issue in China is bureaucracy and states that “the power of a single employee 
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in a single office is huge. It is difficult to explain this to our clients, that the relationships 
with government officials are very important. In China, the government is used to inward 
FDIs, but it has policies suspicious of outward FDIs, so sometimes it is difficult for the 
smaller Chinese investor to go overseas.” The Members Relational Manager for 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China contributes to this discussion of 
comparing China to the West. The manager asserts, “The Chinese government is very 
fast in changing laws, and the power of the bureaucracy is very strong: their parliaments 
do not meet often, official make the actual regulations. Thus, lobbyists in the West talk to 
politicians, here they talk directly to the bureaucracy.  
In analyzing the interview data from the 15 interviews, I found the following 
reoccurring themes throughout the interviews: China reasserting control over their 
markets and focusing on their country domestically, China closing the doors to foreign 
business, China thwarting off the negative impacts of the global financial crisis of 2008, 
Chinese laws rapidly changing after 2008, China’s focus on environmental and energy 
issues, China valuing loyalty in business relationships, and the contrast of business 
relations in China and the West. Because of these overarching themes in the interviews, I 
came to the conclusion that the entrepreneurs were also experiencing such a divergence 
















Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
The history of neoliberalism makes clear that China was an important part of its 
evolution, but scholars disagree over whether China is neoliberal or not. Because Chinese 
development was pivotal for enabling Western neoliberalism, this thesis aimed to study 
the relationship between China and the neoliberal model in the long term. In order to 
determine if neoliberalism can be used to explain Chinese development, this thesis 
analyzed the key economic reforms and indicators of neoliberalism in China and the 
United States decade by decade, from the 1970s to 2010s, as well as extracting themes 
from interview data based on 15 interviews from foreign entrepreneurs who work in 
Shanghai or Suzhou. Three research questions were posed in order to determine the long-
term evolution of legislation that contributed to the shift of China from a command 
economy to an economic powerhouse in the capitalist world economy.  
The first question posed was, “Does a trend of convergence between ‘Western’ 
and Chinese political economies exist?” In analyzing economic reforms implemented in 
China and the United States in parallel from the 1970s to the 2010s decade, I concluded 
that a convergence between Western and Chinese political economies existed. My 
conclusion comes from the following key similarities between China and the United 
States in each decade. There was striking parallelism in the economic situation in United 
States and China in the 1970s, despite the fact that the countries were completely 
different. In short, both countries were committed to political economic models that had 
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not merged after World War II. Both countries were experiencing dire economic 
situations after World War II, and despite both countries’ commitment to patterns of the 
past, the leadership in China and the United States began to search for other economic 
alternatives around the same time. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, both China and 
the United States were moving in a clear neoliberal policy direction since the neoliberal 
elements of privatization, deregulation, cuts in public spending, floating exchange rates, 
protection of property rights, liberalization of trade and investment, and limits to state 
power can be seen in China and the United States throughout these two decades. With 
both countries strongly committed to their overall economic strategy in the 1990s, 
parallelism between China and the United States can also be seen based on the 
flourishing inequality and reduced welfare for citizens. After 2008, both countries at the 
same time seem to diverge from the neoliberal model, evidenced by policy changes 
adopted in the 2000s and 2010s to enable states to reassert control over markets and the 
redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns. 
My second research question asked, “If there is a trend, how has it changed over 
time?  As addressed in the previous research question, there was a trend of convergence 
between Western and Chinese political economies, and this trend has changed in the way 
that the United States and China were going in a clear neoliberal direction in the 1980s-
1990s, but, after analyzing Chinese and US reforms in the 2000s-2010s decades, I 
concluded that this neoliberal direction shifted in both countries, and a different kind of 
model is taking shape in both China and the US that diverges from neoliberalism since 
the policies being implemented throughout those decades run directly contrary to the core 
practices of neoliberalism 
	 110	
The final question this thesis set out to answer was, “Is China evolving towards, 
or away from the neoliberal model? Or rather should a different concept be used?” After 
analyzing the key indicators of neoliberalism in each decade in the United States and 
China and extracting themes from the interview data from the foreign entrepreneurs in 
China, this thesis concludes that China is evolving away from the neoliberal model.  
Regarding the question “Should a different concept be used?” I concluded that 
neoliberalism is the right concept to use. While the policies being implemented in the 
most recent decades are not neoliberal, the concept of neoliberalism can be used to 
explain such reforms because the policies implemented run directly contrary to the core 
practices of neoliberalism. Based on Chinese policies in the 1980s-1990s, China was 
moving in a neoliberal direction due to the focus on capital accumulation, the expansion 
of commercial markets, the privileging of corporations, deregulation of labor markets, 
and dismantling of social protections, but in the 2000s-2010s, we start to see the policies 
alter in a different, non-neoliberal direction. During this time, the Chinese state maintains 
a commitment to protect many elements for their citizens, such as the establishment of a 
new social security system in order to ensure workers’ rights and protect them against 
market dysfunction. In the 2000s, China began to pay more attention to China’s income 
distribution system, social services system, energy issues, and the quality of the 
environment. The shift in Chinese labor laws in the 2000s signal a departure from 
neoliberalism since such developments in labor suggest an end to the era of cheap labour 
in China and a relatively more optimistic future for Chinese workers due to the increased 
real wages, better social protection, and pension benefits. Such reforms in China directly 
contradict a key tenant of neoliberalism, the process of progressive erosion of legal 
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protections to labor.  China’s departure from the neoliberal model is evidenced by policy 
changes being adopted to enable states to reassert control over markets and the 
redirecting of the market economy towards social concerns. Post 2008, the Chinese 
Government has major influence in the amount and nature of investment in China, 
particularly in infrastructure and in the selection of key sectors for development. 
Continuing to stray from the neoliberal path in the current decade, the Chinese leadership 
further focuses on the improvement of socialist market economy, ensuring a healthy and 
lasting development of the economy in order to continuously improve the population’s 
standard of living, the development of rural economy, and creating new workplaces for 
the population. The interviews from the foreign entrepreneurs in china further back up the 
claim that China is diverging from a neoliberal path. The interviews stress how China in 
the current decade is reasserting control over their markets, focusing on their country 
domestically, and serving the Chinese people more and more.  A key aspect of a 
neoliberal path is implementing policies that open up foreign markets, but as addressed in 
the interview data, in the most recent decades, China has closed their doors to foreign 
employees, implemented laws putting limitations on importers, closed the market in 
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